Non-Pecuniary Loss in Personal Injury: Topography Architecture and Nomenclature in the European Landscape by Banakas, Stathis
JCL 10:2           291
stathis banakas
Non-Pecuniary Loss in Personal 
Injury: Topography Architecture 
and Nomenclature in the European 
Landscape
STATHIS BANAKAS
University of East Anglia, School of Law
Omnis condemnatio pecuniaria est1
Liberum corpus nulum recipit aestimationem2
INTRODUCTION
This paper is a study of the ideology, language, topography, architecture and nomenclature 
of compensation for non-pecuniary loss in Europe. It aims at throwing light on the 
meaning of concepts and compensation categories and comparing solutions in different 
jurisdictions. It is work done in the context of the Common Core of European Private law 
project, fundamental research in what is common and uncommon in European private 
law.3
Redress for non-pecuniary loss from personal injury has gradually increased in 
importance and is now placed centre-stage in all jurisdictions, but both ontologically and 
topographically, shows a polymorphism and presents exciting challenges. Not only is the 
terminology of compensation different within the narrow central-case personal injury 
claim, but mapping personal injury redress in different jurisdictions reveals a broader 
picture of polymorphism emerging from intersecting systematic divisions of liability 
regimes, perceived aims of civil and criminal liability, judicial and doctrinal development 
of concepts and ontological categories of damage and assessment methods, and the 
practical needs of litigation funding and resort to third-party payers for purposes of loss 
allocation. In addressing, and, hopefully, illuminating the complexity of non-pecuniary 
loss in personal injury, this paper aims at also illuminating the question on how best to 
1 ‘All court judgments are judgments to pay damages’.
2 ‘The body of a free man accepts no monetary estimation’.
3 On the Common Core of European Private Law project, its methodology, aims and prospects, see Bussani, M 
& Mattei, U (1996-1997) ‘The Common Core Approach to European Private Law’ (3) Columbia Journal of European 
Law 339.
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deal with compensation of personal injury that has dominated Tort scholarship in the 
last few decades. It starts with a look at the intellectual foundations of the European 
cultures of monetary compensation for personal injury, and the values underpinning such 
a translation into money of some of the most personal and intimate losses. These values 
are seen to have undergone a transformation with the rising significance of fundamental 
rights and the overarching value of human dignity after the human rights abuses in 
Europe in the twentieth century. Compensation cultures are expressed in legal concepts 
and terms with different shades of meaning and emphasis on the fundamental themes 
of liability and compensation and the meaning of personal injury itself. The paper will 
look into the importance of these shades of meaning in the main European traditions, 
and their place in the architecture and nomenclature of personal injury compensation in 
different jurisdictions. In understanding architectures and nomenclatures, it is important 
to distinguish between ontology of harm (i.e. the medical description of harm) and 
normative nomenclature (i. e. the legal terminology used in the juridical assessment of 
harm), the former inevitably common in all jurisdictions but the latter, also inevitably, 
different. Beyond an effort of understanding the different nomenclatures, this study will 
compare and assess their limits and the areas of uncertainty remaining after years of 
evolution, with some final reflections on the current state of play and challenges laying 
ahead. 
THE IDEOLOGY
The global legal landscape shows types of harm morphing into liability regimes in 
different jurisdictions. Types of non-pecuniary harm belonging in some jurisdictions to 
the common nomenclature of personal injury, (for example domage moral –moral damage-
in French law or danos psicofisicos –psychophysical injuries-in Spanish law) appear in other 
jurisdictions as special categories of liability: for example, nervous shock (English law), 
unwanted birth (German law, English law). In several jurisdictions the compensation of 
non-pecuniary harm is linked to the standard of liability. No-fault regimes tend to exclude 
or restrict compensation of such harm, with some notable exceptions.4
I have written on the globalization and contemporary importance of Civil liability law 
(Tort law) elsewhere.5 It is today clearer than ever before that monetary compensation for 
harm that follows from finding a person or an organization responsible for a civil wrong is 
an indispensable tool of national and global justice. 
While the philosophical and cultural foundations of the Common law traditions of 
Tort law are, simply, empirical-utilitarianist and, in the case of American Tort law, also 
liberal-pragmatic, Tort law in the Civil law tradition carries a heavier load of philosophical 
and doctrinal baggage. In the European, and also Latin American, legal traditions, there 
are Natural law influences on codes and case law, and important tensions between 
phenomenological/conceptual versus functional/descriptive views of liability for personal 
injury and compensation. The natural law heritage shows an unresolved conflict between 
4 But see the opposite in French and, now also, German, law, below. Significantly, the EU Directive 85/374/EEC 
excludes non-pecuniary losses from the no-fault regime of product liability it introduces, refusing to harmonize 
the laws of member states in this connection.
5 See Banakas, S (2007) ‘A Global Concept of Justice: Dream or Nightmare? Looking at Different Concepts of 
Justice or Righteousness Competing in Today’s World’ in (67) Louisiana Law Review 1. 
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the fundamentally libertarian-individualistic view of casum sentit dominus6 and the 
moralistic-republican view of alterum non laedere.7 The Romanistic and Germanic sub-
traditions of Tort liability for personal injury are broadly divided along these lines, as 
evidenced by the French (1804), and German (1896) Civil Codes. While the Tort law of 
the French Civil Code is founded on the neminem leadere principle, the Tort law of the 
German Civil Code shows greater affinity with the principle of casum sentit dominus. 
More important, however, is the more recent influence in Europe of the thinking of the 
phenomenological school (Schopenhauer),8 brilliantly applied to the legal conceptual 
analysis by Rudolf von Jehring.
In the thinking of Jehring, clearly influenced by Schopenhauer, monetary compensation 
for loss, especially personal injury loss, is an indispensable foundation of social action, 
both in ancient and in modern society. More specifically, Jehring argued that money is the 
only equal and perfect reward for achievement or satisfaction for loss in social intercourse. 
Another influential German thinker, Karl Binding, has remarked that while Criminal 
liability is about the irreparable, Tort liability is about the reparable: ‘The source of 
punishment is an irreparable state of injustice; punishment is the diminution of another 
right for the purpose of making good this irreparable wrong; damage indemnification, in 
contrast, is the alleviation of a reparable condition violative of the law’.9
Obviously, following Binding’s thinking, there is a need to identify the reparable and the 
irreparable. Is, for example, injury to reputation ‘reparable’ and, therefore, indemnifiable, 
or is it ‘irreparable’ and, therefore, only fit for punishment (by Criminal law)? Binding’s 
influence was evident on the German Civil Code of 1986, in which the only injury to 
reputation covered by the law of civil liability was that to a person’s financial reputation 
(evidently reparable in money), but not any other. Indeed, as will be discussed later in this 
paper, the German Civil code forbade in principle the compensation of non-material loss 
(in German: immaterieller Schaden) that might be considered as irreparable. Could the quite 
separate development of punitive damages in Tort law in the common law tradition be 
similarly seen as recognition that there is something irreparable to the victim that needs to 
be accounted for by the wrongdoer? This is more evident in US Tort litigation for personal 
injury, where the aims of Tort action clearly include deterrence, punishment and an after 
the event regulation, and where Tort law sometimes works as a ‘private attorney general’. 
Punitive damages in order to remove the tortfeasor’s profit from their wrong can be seen 
as removing the wrongful gratification for the sake of completeness of the legal order (see 
below Jehring’s theory of interest). 
But to return to Jehring,10 it is evident that in his mind the violation of every interest is 
capable of reparation, indeed, for Jehring it seems that reparation in the form of monetary 
compensation is fundamental to every kind of social intercourse. Jehring draws from 
Schopenhauer for the importance of purposeful human action and the idea of interest as 
a key concept of social and legal ordering. Schopenhauer said: ‘Will without interest is a 
6 That could be understood as meaning that the loss must be carried by the victim.
7 Meaning ‘do not injure another’. As in Justinian’s Institutes Inst. 1, 1, 3
8 See below note 9.
9 Binding, C (1922), Die Normen und Ihre Uebertretung (Norms and their Violation) I, 4th ed. Leipzig 290; as 
translated by Stoll, H (1983) in International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, vol. XI Torts, Chapter 8, Consequences 
of Liability: Remedies 3.
10 Von Jehring, R (1877) Der Zweck im Recht (Law as a Means to an End) Erster Band, Leipzig 
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will without a purpose, that is to say an outcome without cause’ (‘ein Wollen ohne Interesse 
ist ein Wollen ohne Motiv, also eine Wirkung ohne Ursache’).11
To which Jehring added: ‘Social intercourse is the complete system of egoism, nothing 
more (‘Der Verkehr ist das vollendete System des Egoismus, weiter nichts’)’.12 And: ‘Interest is 
the indispensable precondition of every act-acting without interest is as much nonsense as 
acting without purpose, it is a psychological impossibility’ (‘Interesse ist die unerlaessliche 
Voraussetzung einer jeder Handlung-ein Handeln ohne Interesse ist ein eben solches Unding als 
ein Handeln ohne Zweck, es ist eine psychologische Unmoeglichkeit’);13 and ‘There is no idea, 
like the idea of compensation, that has for human beings something so mandatory (‘Es 
gibt keine Idee, die fuer den Menschen etwas so Zwingendes haette, wie die der Ausgleichung’).14…
Only money is capable to truly solve the task of social intercourse, i.e. to establish the real 
system of guaranteed full satisfaction of human needs […] Money satisfies every need, 
the most noble and the lowest, and to every calculable degree, the highest as well as the 
smallest’ (‘Nur das Geld ist im Stande, die Aufgabe des Verkehrs wirklich zu loesen d. h. das reale 
System der gesicherten Befriedigung der menschliche Beduerfnisse in vollender Weise herzustellen’ 
‘das Geld befriedigt alle Beduerfnisse, die edelsten wie die niedersten, und in jedem beliehigen 
Maasse, in groessten wie in kleinsten’).15 Our personal freedom and independence is about 
being able and obliged to pay…on money clings not only our financial, but also our non-
material independence’ (Unsere persoenliche Freiheit und Unabhaengigkeit beruft darauf, dass 
wir zahlen koennen und muessen-im Geld steckt nicht bloss unsere oekonomische, sondern auch 
unsere moralische unabhaengigkeit’).16
But how can we define an interest? An interest is the satisfaction of a need causing a 
feeling of gratification. More specifically:
• In the case of an economic or material interest: a need is satisfied by means of an 
economic or material nature, by using material goods or immaterial goods capable 
of having an exchange value;
• In the case of a moral interest: a need is satisfied through human faculties only, 
exercised freely and in relation to persons or things, but without the involvement 
of economic means and independently of the use of goods. For example, in the old 
pioneering judgment of the Court of Brussels, of 24 December 1884, an example of 
a moral interest is ‘the enjoyment of movement, of which an accident victim had 
been deprived’. As Jehring demonstrated at some length, the recognition of such 
moral interests dates back to classical Roman law, in remedies such as those for 
vera rei estimatio (real value of the thing), affectus (emotion), pietas (piety) and other 
types of what one might call today non pecuniary harm.17
Jehring’s bold affirmation of interest-based human existence fulfilled by monetary 
reward or compensation implies that the Law should aim at the compensation for the 
11 Schopenhauer, A (1860) Die Beiden Grundprobleme der Ethik (Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics) 2 ed, 
Leipzig 165.
12 Ibid at 125
13 Ibid at 58.
14 Ibid at 124. 
15 Ibid at127.
16 Ibid at128.
17 But, significantly, see Gaius in D 9, 3, 7: In the case of an injury to the body suffered by a freeman, there can 
be no compensation for scars or any other disfigurement because of the general rule that the body of a freeman 
cannot be appraised financially (as is the case with the body of a slave or a son). 
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violation of both a material and a moral interest, and adds sense to the open-ended, broad 
regimes of personal injury compensation in the Romanistic sub-tradition, which place the 
compensation of non material harm on the same basis as the compensation of material 
harm (see details below). But it can also add sense, combined with Binding’s views on the 
reparable and the irreparable, to the historical tendency of the Germanic sub-tradition to 
restrict compensation to that which is clearly reparable. Jehring would not object to not 
compensating that which is irreparable to the individual, i.e. the violation of a collective 
interest that cannot be broken down to specific individual interests. But he would, perhaps, 
object to the non-compensation of an individual moral interest if its violation affects the 
victim’s non-material independence. 
Another important development since Jehring’s pioneering work, the seeds of which 
can be found already at the dawn of classical Roman law (the law of iniuria-insult) and, also 
the common law (the law of trespass to the person), is the emergence of a certain distinction 
between the compensation of an individual interest violated and the compensation for 
the violation of our (shared) human dignity. This accounts for serious questions facing 
contemporary personal injury compensation law in different jurisdictions, such as:
• Should the violation of personality rights be actionable per se, and such rights be 
afforded normative (Constitutional) protection irrespective of actual harm?
• Should the aim be to put the victim in the previous position they were before the 
wrong was done, or to make the victim ‘whole’? Example of a tendency towards 
the latter is the compensation of the loss of amenity in English law, and the prejudice 
d’agrement (loss of enjoyment)in French law, of the unconscious victim.
• Should the measure of personal injury compensation be victim-individualization 
or victim-categorization? Again, this is a choice that divides personal injury 
compensation regimes, especially with regard to non-pecuniary harm, but, also, 
with regard to future loss of earnings. 
This move from the individual to the (human) species, as it were, opens the floodgates 
for the reparation of the irreparable: Deterrence and enforcement of rights (the German 
doctrine of Rechtsfortsetzungsfunktion18 of civil actions) are brought inside the calculus of 
personal injury compensation, sitting rather uncomfortably with more traditional ideas 
of corrective justice. Corrective justice demands the restoration of the victim’s state to 
that before the wrong occurred. It seems an idea that fits Jehring’s view of restoring with 
monetary compensation fairness in social intercourse. But aren’t rights better enforced in 
naturam19 (i.e. by specific performance)? In Jehring’s home turf, the Germanic tradition, 
restoration in naturam has been the rule, whereas the common law tradition looks in 
principle to monetary compensation and the French tradition also seems to do the same 
(although there is no clear rule or principle about this in the Code Civil or case law). 
Admittedly, this difference is much more relevant in the case of compensation for property 
damage than in the case of personal injury where it is not possible to compensate in naturam 
for important types of harm, such as non-pecuniary harm.20 Indeed, non-pecuniary harm 
is, according to one view21 (not that of Jhering, obviously), impossible to compensate 
18 This almost untranslatable German legal concept means broadly ‘legal development function’.
19 Compensation in kind.
20 But see below, the theory of satisfaction or ‘gift’.
21 See, generally, Abel, RL (1989-1990) ‘A Critique of Torts’ (37) University of California at Los Angeles Law 
Review 785 
Non-Pecuniary Loss in Personal Injury
296 JCL 10:2
in money, without commodifying, and, therefore, devaluing, human dignity. In short, 
the move from individual interest to the dignity of the species encourages punitive, 
deterrent damages and reparation in naturam, wherever this is possible, rather than 
monetary compensation based on the violation of an individual interest. The difference 
of principle between monetary compensation and reparation in naturam is important in 
order to understand the global topography of personal injury compensation, especially the 
taxonomy of harm types and their treatment in jurisdictions under the spell of Germanic 
legal culture. As shown later, in such jurisdictions non-pecuniary harm types (in German: 
Nichtvermoegen Schaeden) were (traditionally, but recently increasingly less so) viewed as 
in principle non reparable in money, but quite properly so in naturam. Thus non-pecuniary 
losses are included without exception in the general rule of reparation in naturam of para. 
249 of the German CC, but only compensatable in money in the cases envisaged by para. 
253 art. 2 (see infra). By contrast, jurisdictions under the influence of the French legal culture 
are generally opposed to reparation in naturam, recognising in principle only a right to 
monetary compensation. Article 1382 of the French Civil Code imposes on a tortfeasor a 
duty to ‘repair the harm’ (réparer), caused by his fault without specifying if this should be 
reparation in naturam or monetary compensation. But article 1142 of the French Civil Code 
appears to be opposed to such reparation, declaring that “every duty to act or not to act 
results in damages in the case of non-performance by the debtor”,22 a position reflecting 
the natural law abhorrence of violation of personal freedom expressed in the maxim ‘nemo 
potest praecise cogi ad factum’.23
Indeed, it would appear that it is more challenging to ‘compensate’ non-pecuniary 
harm individually, than abstractly through punitive deterrent damages for violations of 
collective human dignity. According to one view, that of the Swiss scholar, Burckhardt, 
pain cannot be compensated, but the wrongdoer should be condemned to offer satisfaction 
(Genugtuung), to the victim with an award to restore the disturbed emotional and 
psychological equilibrium of the injured person.24 This satisfaction can take the form of a 
sum of money, which is, however, only a means to the end of artificially providing the victim 
with a new and different pleasurable experience to counterbalance the painful experience, 
which itself cannot be put right. This broad theory of satisfaction for non-pecuniary harm 
is embedded in the Swiss Civil Code and the revised Swiss Code of Obligations, and also 
has been transplanted to the Greek and Turkish Civil Codes, but finds only a limited 
application in German law, where compensation (Schmerzensgeld25) is the primary purpose 
22 ‘Toute obligation de faire ou de ne pas faire se résout en dommages et intérêts en cas d’inexécution de la part du 
débiteur’. The victim has no right of restitution in kind, according to the French case law: see Cour de Cassation, 
2eme Chambre Civile (Second Civil Chamber) 12 juin 1954 Dalloz 1954 Jurisprudence 588; Cour de Cassation, 
2eme Chambre Civile 23 avril 1959 Bulletin Civil 1959 I 182 no. 216. This position is criticized by leading authors 
who argue that the victim should be entitled to such restitution if it is possible, and should accept it if offered 
by the tortfeasor: see Mazeaud, L & Tunc, A (1960) Traite Theorique et Pratique de la Responsabilite Civile vol. III, 
nos 2304, 2305. 
23 ‘Nobody can be forced to a specific act’. All the more surprising that reparation in kind, forcing the debtor 
to a specific act, is adopted as a principle by German civil law.
24 Burckhardt, CC (1903) Die Revision des Schweizerischen Obligationenerecht in Hinsicht auf das 
Schadensersatzrecht (The revision of the Swiss Law of Obligations with reference to the law of damages) 
Zeitschrift fuer Schweizerisches Recht 23, 469-586. Burckhardt believed that satisfaction is not punishment, for it 
aims at healing the victim rather than wounding (punishing) the wrongdoer. See more in Stoll supra note 10: 
Remedies 9
25 ‘Money for pain’.
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of non-pecuniary loss damages and satisfaction only a second additional purpose (dual 
function of damages)26. Significantly, and under the strong influence of the Constitution 
(Grundgesetz27), German law also envisages a third function for non-pecuniary loss 
damages, the so-called Wuerderfunktion, 28 in cases of personal injuries so severe that leave 
the victim completely unconscious with their personality totally destroyed, excluding any 
possibility of compensation or feeling of satisfaction. In such cases non-pecuniary loss 
damages will be awarded for the ‘pure’ loss of dignity suffered, in one sum without a 
breakdown of the award into different types of damages.29 It may be argued, however, that 
although it would be quite right to underline the important function of Tort litigation to 
also provide individual moral satisfaction to the victim of a wrong, who can face directly 
and call the shots against the wrongdoer in the Civil trial (something which victims cannot 
do in Criminal trials), to view satisfaction as an alternative to compensation in the case of 
non-pecuniary harm does less justice to victims of personal injury, as Jehring’s analysis 
clearly demonstrates, and has not found broader acceptance. Jehring’s theory of interests 
has the advantage of encompassing both the need for economic/material justice and the 
need of restoring fairness and fair play in social action. But moral satisfaction can add an 
element of natural revenge that cannot be completely ignored when human beings (and 
not only human beings) are concerned. As put by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., ‘even a 
dog distinguishes between being stumbled over and being kicked’.30 Rather fascinatingly, 
Jehring’s theory of interests further implies not only a duty to compensate for the violation 
of an interest, but, also, quite possibly a right to do so: if money can make the wrong good 
for the victim, it should also, should it not, make the wrong good also for the wrongdoer? 
The ancient Roman law of iniuria illustrates this well, and the German Civil Code, true to its 
spiritual origins, accepts that the compensation of personal injury includes an element of 
atonement for the wrongdoer This is even clearer in Austrian doctrine and case law where 
compensation for non-pecuniary loss is described as ‘repayment of the injury caused’.31
A further challenge to individualism so eloquently propagated by Jehring has been the 
increasing complexity of social intercourse in the post-industrial era of mass production 
and circulation of goods creating entire industries of statistically unavoidable accidents. 
First, that implies that the community, in whose interests mass production and generation 
26 In Spanish law the Supreme Court and some scholars also speak of the ‘satisfaction’ of the victim as being 
the basis of the compensation of non-pecuniary harm, not in the sense of ‘Genugtuung’, but in the sense of solace 
(solatium), damages allowing the victim to buy, if so wishes, alternative comforts: ‘los duelos con pan son menos 
(bread makes grief less)’. The Spanish Supreme Court refers to compensation as ‘satisfaction for the suffering 
caused’: see Sentencias de Tribunal Supremo (Judgments of the Supreme Court) 25.6.1984 [1984] RJ no. 1144. This 
evokes the functional approach to assessing the quantum, also known in Canada and certain US jurisdictions. 
In the US litigation process, pain and suffering damages have been described as a ‘gift’, sometimes, one might 
add, a generous one, from a jury anxious to show ‘public sympathy and fellow-feeling’, so that the plaintiff can 
purchase distractions and benefits to improve their quality of life.
27 Basic Law as the German Constitution is still called after the reunification.
28 ‘dignity-function’.
29 See Deutsch, E (1993)Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 784; Bundesgerichtshof (German Supreme Court) (1993) 
Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1531, 1532; Oberlandsgericht Stuttgart (Court of Appeal of Stuttgart) (1994) Neue 
Juristische Wochenschrift 3016
30 Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., (1881) The Common Law Little, Brown, 3.
31 See Bydlinski, F ( 1965) 9 Juristische Blaetter 183. See also articles 1323 & 1324 of the Austrian Civil Code 
(Allgemeines Buergerliches Gesetzbuch-ABGB): in cases of intentional harm or gross negligence the tortfeasor is 
under an obligation not only to compensate for any harm, but also to pay damages to “extinguish the insult 
caused” (“Tilgung der verursachten Beleidigung”)
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of risk takes pace, must show solidarity, to a certain extent, to the unfortunate victims 
of such accidents, in the form of social security benefits and compulsory insurance 
arrangements: this would generally agree with Jehring’s concept of interest-driven action, 
but poses questions of economic efficiency and management of claims against third-party 
payers, as well as questions of what to do with so-called collateral benefits to the victim, i. 
e. payments received by the victim which have been triggered off by the accident. Second, 
personal injury is, inevitably, not only commodified but, moreover, commercialised, 
because industrial and technological advances add to the complexity and cost of litigation 
and the reality on the ground demands that, if violated interests are to be compensated 
at all, new and innovative ways of reducing litigation and litigation funding must be 
found. The source of injuries is an important factor in this connection, with traffic, medical 
and industrial (employment) accidents competing for being the costlier, socially and 
economically. Importantly, low value claims are increasingly dealt with in special regimes 
that either shield insurers from excessive liability32 or encourage out of court settlement. In 
some jurisdictions, like Spain, the biggest source of personal injury claims, traffic accidents, 
are subject to a special regime that restricts compensation, and in England pioneering 
new ways of third-party litigation funding have just been introduced. Parliament has also 
raised in England to 25,000 the ceiling of so-called Traffic Accident protocols, taking a 
considerable amount of potential litigation away from ordinary procedure onto a fast-
track settlement mechanism.33 In other jurisdictions, such as France, Germany, Portugal, 
no-fault systems for traffic accident injuries are designed to expedite insurance settlements 
and control the overall cost of such accidents, leading to faster, but considerably reduced, 
payoffs. 
THE LANGUAGE
The ideological complexity underpinning tort liability for personal injury in Europe is 
matched with linguistic uncertainly as to fundamental concepts, starting with the concept 
of liability itself. In terms of the main European legal traditions, expressed in the English, 
French, Italian, Spanish, Portuguese and German languages, the uncertainly starts with 
the undisciplined use of key concepts that are not clearly defined in the jurisdiction itself. 
European instruments of harmonization of private law that could have helped in sorting 
out the meaning of key concepts represent, unfortunately, an almost uninterrupted 
sequence of missed opportunities.34
32 See in Italy art 32, comma 3ter, Diritto ltaliano 24.01.2012 n.1, which modified comma 2 of art. 139 of law no 
209/2005 on the Code of Private Insurance: “Injuries of a light nature that are not subject to clinical instrumental 
confirmation cannot be the ground for compensation for a permanent biological damage”. (“In ogni caso, le 
lesioni di lieve entita’, che non siano suscettibili di accertamento clinico strumentale obiettivo, non potranno dar luogo 
a risarcimento per danno biologico permanente”). On the Italian doctrine of danno biologico (biologival injury) see 
infra. Also in England, the Ministry of Justice recently issued a consultation paper on Reducing the number 
and costs of whiplash claims: A consultation on arrangements concerning whiplash injuries in England and Wales 
December 2012, Consultation Paper CP17/2012; see also Parliamentary debates in <http://www.parliament.uk/
business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/transport-committee/news/whiplash-report/> (Retrieved 
13.08.2015) 
33 Pre-Action Protocol for Low Value Personal Injury Claims in Road Traffic Accidents: available at:< http://www.
justice.gov.uk/courts/procedure-rules/civil/protocol/prot_rta> (Retrieved 13.08.2015)
34 See on the disparity of terminology in European Private law legislation and case law Weitenberg, M (2008) 
‘Terminology’ in Koziol, H & Schulze, R (eds.) Tort Law of the European Community Springer at 309 and following.
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The English pair of concepts liability/responsibility finds some correspondence in 
the German concepts of Haftung/Verantwoertlichkeit, while French law uses the single 
concept of responsabilite (Spanish: responsabilidad; Italian: responsabilita). The EU so-called 
prospectus directive of 200335 is an example of a missed opportunity to clarify the meaning 
and the correspondence of these basic concepts in the three different languages and legal 
traditions, because they are used as alternatives, which clearly they are not. Briefly, in 
English tort law responsibility is normally a question of fact, an indication, among others, 
of sufficient grounds to establish liability (e.g. in the case of assumption of responsibility 
for omissions or for a special negligence duty, such as a duty not to cause economic loss). 
The German concept of Verantwoertlichkeit is used in German law in a way broadly similar 
to that of responsibility in English law. By contrast, responsabilite in French law means 
primarily liability in the legal sense, as used by jurisprudence and doctrine and despite the 
ambiguity of the texts, only if, however, it is used in the context of an application of a legal 
norm. Otherwise, it may well be used, even in a judgement, in a rather more colloquial 
sense (eg ‘la personne responsable’-the person responsible).
At the other end of the spectrum, another basic concept, expressed in English as 
compensation corresponds in French often with a concept that signifies both the act of 
compensating and the result of that act (indemnification or indemnite). The English concept 
of indemnity is often used to mean something different, a payment to the victim by a party 
other than the tortfeasor, or a payment by the tortfeasor to a party other than the victim.36 
The English pair of concepts Compensation or Reparation corresponds to the French 
indemnisation or reparation, and the German Ausgleich or Ersatz. The former refers in all legal 
traditions to monetary compensation, whereas the latter to restitution in naturam (above). 
But German doctrine also uses the pair of terms Geldentschaedigung /Naturalrestitution37. 
Fair compensation corresponds to the French compensation ou idemnite equitable and 
the German gerechter Ausgleich or billiges Ermessen, which is the basis of assessment of 
non-pecuniary damages. While reasonable compensation in English law corresponds 
with indemnite raisonable in the French legal tradition, the same notion is expressed as 
angemessene Entschaedingung in the German legal tradition, as the term Ausgleich can only 
mean full compensation. In the case of non-pecuniary losses, the term Wiedergutmachung38 
is increasingly used as the preferred term, as such losses are by their nature impossible to 
fully compensate.39
The generic concept of personal injury is itself a concept that, perhaps because of 
its fundamental moral, social and economic importance, is also ill-defined and applied 
differently in different legal cultures. In English law, whereas very little can be said 
about the concept of ‘personal’, other than that in the present context it only applies to 
physical persons and that, in English law, a person begins to exist at the moment after 
35 2003/71/EC amended by Directive 2010/73/EU.
36 Interestingly, the US Restatement Torts (1979) paragraph 903 states as aims of Tort liability: ‘to compensate, 
indemnify or provide restitution’.
37 See Deutsch, E and Ahrens, H-J (2011) Deliktsrecht, Schadensersatz, Schmerzensgeld (Tort law, Compensation, 
Money for Pain) 4th edition de Gruyter 213.
38 This term literarily means “making good again”, but can be rendered in English as reparation or, even, 
atonement.
39 See recently Schubert, C (2013) Die Wiedergutmachung immaterieller Schäden im Privatrecht (The Restoration of 
non-material harm in Private law) Mohr.
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birth,40 ‘injury’ is a concept that invites some thought. It would appear that personal 
injury implies a physical encroachment upon someone’s person, more precisely a hurtful 
invasion (lesion) of someone’s corporal integrity. But today injury is a concept that can 
encompass in English law all kinds of loss or damage resulting from an interference with 
a person. Furthermore, injury is also used to denote encroachment upon an interest, e.g. 
injury to reputation, injury to feelings, injury to financial interests. In medical injury cases 
injury includes failure to prevent or cure a disease, or disability (for example, dyslexia41) or 
a violation of a person’s autonomy, as in cases of wrongful birth42 or uninformed consent.43 
French law uses as generic term the term prejudice corporel (corporal injury). It is clear that 
prejudice corporel includes, but may extend beyond, corporal lesions (lesions corporelles). 
Another important distinction in French law is that between ‘prejudice’ and ‘dommage’. As 
pointed out in an important recent French report on the reform of the personal injury 
nomenclature,44 the term ‘prejudice’ is normative-legal in nature and indicates an attack 
on the victim’s patrimonial or extra-patrimonial rights. The new French nomenclature 
known as nomenclature Dintilhac (on which see extensively infra), adopts this normative 
terminology and its application is, significantly, for this reason, subject to the control 
of the Cour de Cassation. The term ‘dommage’ is, by contrast, factual in nature and its 
presence normally falls under the sovereign jurisdiction of the trial judge as a matter 
of fact. A leading practical manual on the French law of personal injury compensation 
points out that ‘dommage’ is in every instance translated into ‘prejudice’ with the combined 
intervention of professionals such as health experts, doctors, work-therapists, architects, 
accountants and, of course, lawyers!45 Finally, German law uses the term personal injury 
(“Koerper Verletzung”), which is close to the French, but distinguishes health (Gesundheit) 
as a separate protected interest.46
In all three traditions it seems that personal injury ‘damage’ or ‘loss’ is primarily the 
harm resulting from a physical lesion to the body (‘dommage’ in French law, ‘Schaden’ 
in German law). Non-pecuniary harm which is not the result of such a physical lesion 
is treated by German and English law as a different category of harm, Schockshaeden or 
Nervous Shock. According to the German BGB, the person responsible for an unlawful 
invasion of another’s corporal integrity or health has an obligation to offer reparation for any 
damage suffered, including, significantly, non-pecuniary harm. The new para 253 Part 2 of 
40 Under the Congenital Disabilities (Civil Liability) Act 1976 (see also The Human Fertilization and Embryology Act 
1990, and the Nuclear Installations Act 1965) a child can sue for personal injuries suffered before birth caused 
by the wrongful act of a third party (other than the mother), which resulted in the child being born with a 
disability. 
41 See Phelps v Hillingdon London Borough Council [2001] 2 AC 619
42 See Rees v Darlington Memorial Hospital NHS Trust [2003] UKHL 52
43 See Chester v Afshar [2004] UKHL 41; [2005] 1 AC 134
44 Rapport Lambert-Faivre (15 juin 2003): “dommage” relève de l’élément factuel, et “prejudice” relève du droit et 
exprime une atteinte aux droits subjectifs patrimoniaux ou extrapatrimoniaux subie par la victime» («Damage shows 
a factual element and injury shows a legal element and expresses an encroachment against subjective rights 
, patrimonial or non-patrimonial, suffered by the victim»): see Le Roy, M, Le Roy, J-D, and Bibal, F (2013) 
L’Evaluation du Préjudice Corporel (Evaluation of personal Injury) 19th ed. LexisNexis 2 following 
45 Ibid, 13 following 
46 Para. 823 I of German Civil Code (Buergerliches Gesetzbuch-BGB): ‘Wer vorsätzlich oder fahrlässig das Leben, den 
Körper, die Gesundheit, die Freiheit, das Eigentum oder ein sonstiges Recht eines anderen widerrechtlich verletzt, ist dem 
anderen zum Ersatz des daraus entstehenden Schadens verpflichtet’ (“He who intentionally or negligently injures the 
life, body, health, freedom, property or other similar right of another is obliged to compensate the other for any 
resulting damage”).
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the German Civil Code (hereafter: BGB), extends the obligation to include non-pecuniary 
harm in the compensation of losses resulting from injury to body, health, freedom or sexual 
self-autonomy. This is a broad spectrum and has allowed German courts to include into 
the concepts of injury to body and health diverse pathologies such as an accident-induced 
drug addiction47 and the encroachment upon pure affection interests.48. Injury to health 
can also be painless,49 but must manifest itself as a physical or psychical illness. “Illness” is 
defined according to the common, not medical-expert, view.50 The definition of an injury 
to health adopted by the courts in Germany is, indeed, broad, coming close to the French 
principle of inviolability of the human person in articles 16 et seq. of the Code Civil. The 
German Federal Supreme Court for Civil law matters (Bundesgerichtshof, thereafter BGH) 
has held that health injury includes ‘any inducement of a state, which varies-in an adverse 
way-with that of the body’s normal functioning, it is inconsequential whether a condition 
of pain comes about or a drastic change of one’s existential orientation occurs’.51 Equally 
broad seems to be the approach of the English House of Lords in their remarkable decision 
in the case of Chester v Afshar,52 where the majority held that an invasion of a patient’s 
autonomy and dignity deserves the award of damages. An unavoidable, very small, risk of 
paralysis in a surgical procedure when it materialised was held to be compensable personal 
injury by the doctor who had failed to advise the patient of the risk before the operation. 
Nevertheless, the House of Lords made it clear in another important judgment in the 
combined appeals of Rothwell v Chemical & Insulating Co Ltd53 that in the absence of any 
actual impact to health, a freestanding feeling of anxiety or depressive illness caused by 
the fear of eventually developing a disease is not a compensatable head of non-pecuniary 
loss.54 In cases involving exposure to asbestos causing the development by the claimants of 
pleural plaques, it was held that anxiety or depressive illness caused by fear of contracting 
mesothelioma was not actionable against the employer, if the claimants remained without 
symptoms of a disease.55 This is clearly a narrower view of what amounts to personal 
47 Palandt, O (2012) Buergerliches Gesetzbuch (German Civil Code) 71st ed. Para. 253 no 11
48 Muenchener Kommentar zum Buergerlichen Gesetzbuch (Munich Commentary on the German Civil Code), 
(2007) 5th edition Band 2 Paras 241-432, Para 253 no. 9; see also Stoll, H (1993) Haftungsfolgen im buergerlichen 
Recht, Eine Darstellung auf rechtsvergleichender Grundlage Heidelberg 351.
49 Jaeger, L and Luckey, J (2007) Schmerzensgeld 6th ed. at p 77,no. 298. Similarly broad is the approach of the 
courts in Austria where non-pecuniary harm includes the detriment to the sensory spectrum and the feeling 
of listlessness: von Bar, C (2009) Non-Contractual Liability Arising out of Damage Caused by Another, Principles of 
European Law, Study Group on a European Civil Code Oxford University Press 385. For Switzerland, see Huette, K 
& Landolt, H Genugtuungsrecht (Law of Satisfaction) (2013) Band 2 Genugtuung bei Koerperverletzung (Satisfaction 
for Personal Injury) by Landolt, H, Zürich/St. Gallen.
50 Jaeger L and Luckey, J supra note 49 at 78, no. 300. Unwanted pregnancy and birth, even if normal and 
without complications, is treated as personal injury: BGH (German Supreme Court) Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 
1995, 2407, 2408; Jaeger, L and & Luckey, J supra note 49, at 77, no. 297; Muenchener Kommentar zum Buergerlichen 
Gesetzbuch Band 2 Para 241-432 5th ed. 2007 Para 253 no. 22. Similarly, in English law, see immediately below. 
51 BGH 14 June 2005, Versicherungsrecht 2005, 1238, as translated in von Bar supra note 53. 
52 [2004] UKHL 41; [2005] 1 A.C. 134;
53 Rothwell v Chemical & Insulating Co Ltd and another; Topping v Benchtown Ltd; Johnston v NEI International 
Combustion Ltd; Grieves v F T Everard & Sons Ltd and another, [2007] UKHL 39; [2008] 1 A.C. 281
54 The decision of the House of Lords in Rothwell has been reversed in Scotland by the Scottish Parliament 
enacting the Damages (Asbestos-related Conditions) (Scotland) Act 2009, which was upheld as valid legislation by 
the UK Supreme Court in AXA General Insurance Limited and others v The Lord Advocate and others (Scotland), 
[2011] UKSC 46.
55 The House of Lords may have been motivated by a desire to counterbalance their generous approach to 
claims of mesothelioma victims in Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd, [2002] UKHL 22
Non-Pecuniary Loss in Personal Injury
302 JCL 10:2
injury than that adopted by the BGH in Germany, above. And, as will be shown below, also 
French courts have gone exactly the opposite way in similar cases. Lord Hoffman pointed 
out in Rothwell that “Proof of damage is an essential element in a claim in negligence and in 
my opinion the symptomless plaques are not compensatable damage”.56 His Lordship did 
not seem to accept that such a serious negligent alteration to the worse of a person’s normal 
state of health is per se injury,57 or, alternatively, may be compensatable as a violation of a 
person’s private autonomy,58 although the House of Lords held in Rees v Darlington59 an 
unwanted but normal birth to be an actionable violation of a mother’s private autonomy, 
despite the absence of any injury.60
Inducement of a pathological state or condition seems to be a requirement for a personal 
injury to be present in both English61 and German law.62 Mere infliction of pain will not be 
enough unless it is the result of some injury to the body in the form of (direct or indirect) 
physical impact.63 Working on the basis of a similar requirement of physical impact that 
renders the pain and suffering ‘measurable’ in Austrian law, the Austrian Supreme Court 
refused to award damages for pain and suffering to the wife of a man that left her and their 
marital home to live with another woman, causing her psychological disturbances of a 
pathological nature as a result, including insomnia, headaches, depression and psychoses.64 
The court held that appropriate remedies for the breakdown of a marital relationship are 
those of marriage and divorce law, and mere infidelity, or ‘loss of love’, was not sufficient 
to support a tort claim.65 Similarly in Swiss law it is generally accepted that damages for 
non-pecuniary harm (known as tort moral66), are only available when the victim suffered 
a physical or psychological harm of certain gravity, as a result of an injury to the body or 
the victim’s personality.67 But the Swiss federal tribunal was able to allow recovery of a 
husband’s pain and suffering claim resulting from the hurt and profound disruption of 
56 [2004] UKHL 41, at no. 2 per Lord Hoffmann
57 And a fortiori, in view of the fact that an unconsented alteration of a person’s health to the better is, indeed, 
actionable and compensatable (albeit with nominal damages only) in English law.
58 As held by courts in Germany and several other jurisdictions, see above no. 3. See also Chester v Afshar 2004] 
UKHL 41; [2005] 1 A.C. 134 above.
59 [2003] UKHL 52.
60 Their Lordships in Rothwell seem to have been persuaded by counsel’s argument that it would be against the 
principle of distributive justice to compensate those who suffer ‘no identifiable injury’. But, with respect, this 
begs the question of what is identifiable injury.
61 See Rothwell, supra.
62 See e.g. BGH Versicherungsrecht 1954, 116.
63 See Wagner, G (2009) in Muenchenner Kommentar zum BGB vol. V para. 823 no 71. Nevertheless the local 
court of Frankfurt (Amtsgericht) awarded €400 pain and suffering compensation to a train passenger on a 
German State Railway train resulting from the closure of all train toilets during a two-hour journey: Amtsgericht 
Frankfurt aM, 25 April 2002, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 2002, 2253. This judgment is considered generally 
not to reflect the prevailing view on this issue. But it evokes comparisons with the recently discredited Italian 
doctrine of danno esistenzialle (“existential injury”), on which more below.
64 Oberster Gerichtshof (Austrian Supreme Court) (hereafter: OGH) 20 February 2003, 6 Oberster Gerichtshof in 
Zivilsachen (Ob) 124/0, SZ 2003/16
65 Unless there was also an intention to injure the personality of the spouse (or, presumably, some physical 
harm caused in the process of leaving the spouse). Interestingly, the Austrian Supreme Court (in line with 
courts in many other jurisdictions) recognises claims for pain and suffering caused by bereavement: OGH 2 Ob 
84/01v, Zeitschrift für Verkehrsrecht 2011/73 note E. Karner. Surely, as the French say,‘partir c’est mourir un peu’ 
(leaving is dying a little)?
66 ’Moral tort’
67 See Brehm, R (2013) Berner Kommentar zum Schweizerischem Zivilgesetzbuch (Bern Commentary on the Swiss 
Civil Code) Art. 41-61 OR art 47 no 12 following.
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his relationship with his wife when she was left blind and severely disabled after a traffic 
accident. The court held that the husband was injured indirectly by the accident in his 
personality, as a result of what happened to his wife.68
To return to German law, if there is no real effect on the health or the physical person of 
the victim, compensation (Ausgleich) may not be possible, but can give way to satisfaction 
(Genugtuung: see supra on these notions).69 German law in its aim of vindicating the pure 
loss of human dignity will compensate also the loss of the Empfindungsfaehigkeit (capacity 
to feel) by the victim, awarding pain and suffering damages even when the victim cannot 
feel pain. After taking into account the Constitutional protection of human dignity in art 
1 of the German Grundgesetz, the BGH has held that the non-material loss compensated 
in cases of personal injury included not only physical and psychical pains but also the 
incapacity to feel such pain. What is compensated here is the “destruction of personality 
caused by the removal of the capacity to feel” (Zerstoerung der Persoenlichkeit durch Wegfall 
der Empfindungsfaehigkeit). 70
Further afield in Europe, Spanish law uses the generic terms danos and perjuicios (losses 
and injuries) much in the same way as French law uses the terms dommage and prejudice. 
Interestingly, Portuguese legal doctrine originally rooted in the Romanistic tradition but 
under the spell of Germanic legal science since the introduction of the new Civil Code 
in 1967, uses the concept frustrasao de uma utilitade que era objecto de tutela juridical 71 
(frustration of a value that was the object of legal protection-also reminiscent of Jehring’s 
theory of interests) to denote a harmful invasion of an interest, and the term dano real (“real 
damage”) to denote physical harm. More pragmatic is the new Dutch Civil Code that 
uses a general concept of damage understood by academic doctrine to mean, much as in 
common parlance, any actual detriment.72
Important, but not very helpful, is the contribution to the basic terminology of 
European Private law. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) in its judgment in the case of 
Nil73 seems to understand the French term ‘dommage’ in the sense of ‘harm’, and the term 
‘prejudice’ as ‘damage’, in a confusion of the distinction between actual and ‘normative’ 
damage. The recital of the 1985 Product Liability Directive74 translates ‘‘liability for damage 
resulting from a death or personal injury’ as ‘reparation des dommages causes par la mort et 
par des lesions corporelles’ in French, and ‘Wiedergutmachung von Schaeden, die durch Tod oder 
Koerpervelaetzungen verursacht wurden’, in German.
68 Tribunal Federal Suisse (Swiss Federal Tribunal), 11 March 1988, Arrets du Tribunal Federal (Judgments of 
Swiss federal Tribunal) 112 II 118. See also Tribunal Federal Suisse 22 April 1986, Arrets du Tribunal Federal 112 II 
226, where the court held that the wife of a car accident victim who had been rendered impotent because of his 
injuries was entitled to damages for her tort moral, resulting from the impossibility for the couple to have normal 
sexual relations and a family, which encroached upon her inherent individual rights, and Tribunal Federal Suisse 
23 October 1990, Arrets du Tribunal Federal 116 II 519. 
69 See Slizyk, A (2013) Beck’sche Schmerzensgeld-Tabelle 9th edition Beck no 53 following. 
70 BGH, 13.10.1992, VI ZR 201/91; Slizyk, ibid. no 216 following.
71 See the analysis and references to Portuguese academic doctrine in von Bar above note 54 at 328 and 
following. 
72 See von Bar supra note 49 at 319.
73 ECJ, C-259/96, de Nil [1998] ECR I-2915, para. 23. More on terminology in European Tort law legislation 
and case law in Weitenberg, M (2008) ‘Terminology’, in Koziol, H and Schulze, R (eds.) Tort Law of the European 
Community Springer, 309 and following. Also briefly, Wurmnest, W (2012) ‘Non-Pecuniary Loss’ in Basedow, J; 
Hopt, K and Zimmermann, R(eds) The Max Planck Encyclopedia of European Private Law Vol. II Oxford University 
Press.
74 85/374/EEC
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Related to the discussion of the meaning of personal injury, is the debate, in all major 
traditions, between damage understood in the concrete sense of actual individual loss and 
damage understood in the abstract sense of the harm caused to a person or the legal order 
as a whole, as a result of the violation of a legal norm protecting that person’s interests. 
Here the analysis of Binding and Jehring mentioned above has not, unfortunately, helped 
European legal traditions to proceed on a very rational path. Binding implied that such 
abstract ‘normative harm’ is irreparable to the individual and should be left for criminal 
law to sanction through criminal punishment, as Tort law can only concern itself with the 
reparable, actual harm. However, as the example of the tort of trespass to the person or 
land in English law shows, there may be reparation in Tort of the normative harm suffered 
by a person by means of restoring the status quo ante the normative rule has violated, 
in addition to any criminal punishment. These torts themselves are the damage, and are 
actionable per se. The purpose of the civil action is to vindicate important rights and if 
there is no actual harm the victim may only receive nominal (or, in French law, ‘symbolic’) 
damages.
The distinction between abstract, normative harm and concrete, actual loss should not 
be confused, however, with the distinction between pecuniary and non-pecuniary harm 
or loss,75 such as pain and suffering or loss of amenity. Non-pecuniary harm in this sense 
can be seen, and perhaps should be more correctly seen (although there is an important 
debate about this, as concrete, actual loss as it always implies a detriment beyond the 
pure normative detriment of the violation of the legal norm, unlike, say, in the case of 
a ‘harmless’ trespass. That this detriment may not manifest itself (partly or entirely) 
materially does not imply that it is a purely ‘normative’ detriment, because in the case of 
such non-pecuniary losses the existential state of the victim is altered, as noted by courts 
in Germany and Italy, among others. The manifestation and actuality of non-pecuniary 
losses are, in other words, existential, sometimes physical, but not (entirely) material. 
They are, in fact, existentially more real and actual than, for example, future pecuniary 
losses, such as future losses of earnings. Future pecuniary losses do, of course, look 
more concretely reparable, in Binding’s sense of the term, than present (and future) non-
pecuniary losses. But this is an altogether different kind of discourse that refers to another, 
historically also important, distinction between ‘calculable’ and ‘non-calculable’ loss. 
Another German thinker, Mommsen,76 in the same line of thinking, perhaps, as Binding, 
wrote that compensation or reparation, as a means of restoring the victim’s status quo ante, 
can only be on the basis of calculating the difference between the victim’s material assets 
before and after the wrongful act (Differenzhypothese in German and Austrian law, dano de 
calculo in Portuguese), and cannot, therefore, include any ‘non-material’ losses. This led 
to the evolution of a dogmatic distinction in several jurisdiction in the Germanic tradition 
between material and non-material damage77 (meterieller und immaterieller Schaden), and the 
emergence of a principle that only the former was capable of compensation or reparation,78 
75 Terms used interchangeably in this paper.
76 Mommsen, F (1855) Zur Lehre von dem Interesse Braunschweig : Schwetschke 3
77 The term ‘material damage’ as distinct from pure economic loss was also introduced in English law, in the 
(later overruled) House of Lords decision in Anns v Merton LBC [1978] A.C. 728, in a criticized effort to justify 
the compensation of the loss resulting from structural damage to buildings as non- pure economic loss: see 
Banakas, EK (1977) ‘Defective Premises: Shall the Rate-Payer foot the Bill?’ (36) Cambridge Law Journal 245-248. 
78 See original para. 253 BGB.
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a distinction and a principle, however, that rapidly found a clear exception in the case 
of non-pecuniary harm resulting from personal injury. This distinction is, therefore, not 
particularly helpful or important in the context of liability for personal injury. But another 
distinction, not quite similar but also not entirely different, made traditionally in English 
law, is important: the one between actual, evidenced and calculable pecuniary loss by the 
time of trial, traditionally object of an award of special damages, and loss that is at large 
at the time of trial, whether pecuniary or non-pecuniary, traditionally object of the general 
damages award. This old common law distinction, originally very important to demarcate 
what losses need to be specifically alleged and pleaded from those that do not need to be 
so,79 more accurately reflects the reality of the calculable or otherwise nature of different 
types of harm compensated, than any distinction based on their material or purely, or 
partly, pecuniary nature.80
ONTOLOGY AND NOMENCLATURE: SUMMA DIVISIO  
Ontology and Nomenclature
We will return to the language challenge later on in this paper, looking at nomenclatures in 
detail. Now we need to turn our attention to another area of complexity in compensating 
personal injury. It is important to distinguish the ontology of harm caused to the person 
from the (official or de facto) nomenclatures used in different jurisdictions. The notion of 
ontology as used here refers to the different harmful consequences or harm types identified 
and medically evidenced by claimants in personal injury claims, and nomenclature to the 
normative categorisation and labelling of the harmful consequences as heads of damage 
for the purposes of assessment of damages by the law. Ontology is, largely, factual-
empirical, nomenclature is, largely, normative.81 The ontology of harm is for the trial 
judge to establish (or, as in the US, the jury) as a matter of fact, but the nomenclature is 
a matter of law, subject to control on appeal by higher courts. As an example, in France 
the judicially recognized ontology of suffering compensated under the normative loss 
type of ‘souffrances endourees’ (pain suffered) in the nomenclature Dintilhac includes not 
only pain, anxiety, distress and the like, but also fear (for example, after a plane crash 
or a rape), and behavioral problems of isolation, avoidance, self-immersion, feelings of 
revenge or even rebellion caused by the personal injury.82 It is important to compare harm 
types and nomenclatures and their relationship in different jurisdictions, and assess the 
impact of the presence or absence of nomenclatures on the strategy and implementation 
of compensation, in order to chart the way forward. Conceptually, it is also important to 
understand that the legal nomenclature may or may not correspond with medical or any 
other factual/empirical description of harm-types, at least not in all major jurisdictions. 
79 Jolowicz, JA (1960) ‘The Changing Use of Special Damage and Its Effect on the Law’ (18) Cambridge Law 
Journal 214 ; see also the classic account of McCormick CT (1935) Handbook on the Law of Damages West Publishing 
Co. 34 and following 
80 A distinction that has also appealed to the pragmatism of Scandinavian jurists, who distinguish between 
real/abstract and calculable damage.
81 See above the analysis of the French concepts of ‘dommage’ and ‘prejudice’.
82 Le Roy,M; Le Roy, J-D and Bibal, F (2013) L ‘Evaluation du Préjudice Corporel 19th ed. Paris, LexisNexis, 120, 
no 123; see also below.
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Even if the task is restricted to only the direct victim’s personal harm, excluding third 
party harm, the comparative study of European jurisdictions reveals the spectrum of 
ontology of harm to be wide. For a variety of reasons, which we cannot examine here, 
so-called advanced, developed societies have experienced an increase of personal injury 
litigation that has been fuelled by “creative’ ontology linked to scientific evidence, led by 
lawyers’ self-interest and the growing sense of entitlement in the community. There is a 
debate in all jurisdictions (in this country led by, among others, the Law Commission), 
on the extent to which views of society should influence personal injury ontology and the 
level of awards, either through juries (as in the US), or Compensation Advisory Boards, 
or so-called legislative tariffs.83 Another factor that has contributed to an ever-expanding 
ontology and, also, nomenclature, is the need to allocate losses between the wrongdoer, 
the victim and third party-payers, public or private, a need that has become urgent in the 
light of the rising social and economic cost of accidents, against the background of huge 
sovereign debts and austerity measures. There is an obvious interdependence of ontology 
and assessment regimes and methods, and almost everywhere, but particularly so in 
countries with large social security regimes, the impact of social security benefits available 
for injury or disability on nomenclatures is significant. 
For these reasons and for the additional simple reason that human pleasure and pain, 
as well as human empathy for the suffering of others, express themselves in an infinite 
variety of ways,84 ontology and nomenclature show in every jurisdiction profiles of 
overlapping or intersecting categories (e.g. ‘physical’, ‘material’, ‘economic’, ‘pecuniary’ 
harm or loss and (negative) definitions a contrario, (e. g. ‘non-economic’, non-pecuniary’, 
‘non-material’, non-physical). The anthropological model in use almost everywhere 
seems to be Cartesian: the mind is distinct from the body and an almost bodiless, after 
the accident, victim is often entitled to significant amounts of compensation,85, through 
inventive methods that will be examined in a following section. Furthermore, although 
lack of logic and plenty of experience is said to be the privilege of the common law,86 the 
comparative study reveals everywhere a challenging relationship between ontology and 
nomenclature, on the one hand, and rational-analytical precision, on the other. Examples: 
compensation for pain and suffering can overlap with compensation for loss of earnings, 
as, for example, emotional distress can cause loss of gainful activity. Loss of amenity or 
faculty can overlap in certain jurisdictions with a separately recoverable loss of enjoyment 
of life.87
83 All three have been rejected by the English Law Commission: The Law Commission, Damages for Personal 
Injury: Non-Pecuniary Loss Law Com No 257 no. 3.111-3.188, available at <http://www.open.gov.uk/lawcomm/ >
84 ‘The various forms of mental sufferings are as numberless as the capacities of the human soul for torturing 
itself’: McCormick, CT (1933) Handbook on the Law of Damages at  316.
85 Sometimes amounting to windfalls for those third parties close to them (relatives), as cynics never stop to 
point out.
86 As a famous quote says the life of the law has not been logic; it has been experience’, Oliver Wendell Holmes 
Jr., (1881) The Common Law 5.
87 e.g. the French préjudice d’agrément (loss of enjoyment)
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Is there a summa divisio of personal injury loss in European jurisdictions?
In English common law a clear summa divisio has emerged between pecuniary and non-
pecuniary loss. In the Civil law tradition this division corresponds to a summa division 
between the loss to the victim’s patrimony and extra-patrimonial loss, seen as a loss of a 
purely personal, not financial, nature. For all intends and purposes non-pecuniary and 
extra-patrimonial loss are equivalent terms, and will not, therefore, be further juxtaposed 
in this study, and will be used interchangeably. But the ontological summa divisio has not 
always been that between pecuniary and non-pecuniary or extra-patrimonial harm in all 
other European legal traditions. It appears to have been the established summa divisio in 
English and French law for some time,88 but not everywhere else. There is a strong Germanic 
tradition of a summa divisio between material and non-material loss, concepts explained 
above, non-material loss presently defined by a leading German scholar as ‘such damage 
or injury as cannot, strictly speaking, be measured in monetary terms’.89 This definition 
is broader than the classic Mommsenian definition of immaterieller Schaden already 
mentioned, and shows that non-material harm is understood by and large in Germanic 
systems as non-pecuniary harm. Whether or not, as a matter of analytical precision, the 
one term is preferable to the other is an interesting question: purists might argue that 
there is a fundamental definitional illogicality in the pecuniary compensation of non-
pecuniary harm and that the German term might be preferable, especially if the pecuniary 
award for non-material harm can be seen as ‘satisfaction’ rather than,90 or in addition to,91 
compensation. However, equally strong has been in Germany a tradition going back to 
Jehring who spoke of the importance of ‘nicht-oekonomische interessen’(“non-economic 
interests”).92 Additionally, leading scholars in Austria have also put forward the important 
view that immaterial interests are in principle more important than material interests,93 
and even in the case of a violation of a material interest what is really compensated is 
88 Although almost everywhere in Europe until the beginning of the 20th century, non-pecuniary harm was 
hardly recognised: see the very interesting comparative study of Hidalgo, CD (1998) ‘La Indemnizacion por 
Dano Moral, Modernas Tendencias en el Derecho Civil Chileno y Comparado’ (The Compensation of Moral 
Injury, Modern tendencies in Chilean and Comparative law) Revista Chilena de Derecho vol. 25 no 1 2755. ‘Battre 
monnaie de ses larmes est une estrange alchimie’ (beating with money one’s tears is a strange alchemy): words of a 
French author, Morange, in Dalloz 1962 Chronique 15, summarizing the old moral objections to the recovery of 
non-pecuniary loss.
89 Hans Stoll, H, supra, note 9, p. 17. Older German law and doctrine also used the Latin term solatium to 
denote damages for pain and suffering (see Zimmermann, R (1990) The Law of Obligations Oxford 1093), a term 
still used today in the same sense in Scots and South African (Roman Dutch) law: Reid, K and Zimmermann, 
R (eds) (2000) A History of Private Law in Scotland Vol. 2 Oxford University Press 529. The term solatium is still 
often used by lawyers in England and Wales today to denote damages for pain and suffering, when advising 
clients.
90 As in Swiss doctrine.
91 As in German doctrine.
92 Von Jehring, R (1880) ‘Ein Rechtsgutachten betreffend die Gaubahn’ (A legal opinion concerning the local 
train) Jahrbücher fur die Dogmatik des heutigen römischen und deutschen Privatrechts Bd. 18,  59. 
93 Karner, E and Koziol, H (2001) ‘Austria, Non-pecuniary loss under Austrian law’ in W. V. Horton Rogers 
(ed.) Damages for Non-Pecuniary Loss in a Comparative Perspective, Tort and Insurance Law vol. 2 Vienna/New York 
Springer, 6. See also Strasser, R (1984) Der Immaterieller Schaden im oesterreichischen Recht (Non-material loss in 
Austrian law) 56 following, arguing that the compensation of pecuniary loss is itself aimed at protecting from 
indirect violations of the right of personality, and that the compensation of non-pecuniary loss from direct 
violations of this right, and should, a fortiori, be fully accepted. E. Karner and H. Koziol also point out that as 
quite often the victim’s loss of wages is paid by the employer and medical costs by medical insurance, damages 
for non-pecuniary loss are the only compensation that the victim can get directly from the tortfeasor: ibid 7.
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the personal loss of the material interest’s owner. The authoritative Austrian author 
Franz Bydlinski draws an argument a fortiori from para. 1331 of the Austrian Civil Code 
(ABGB),94 which allows the compensation of pecuniary loss resulting from damage to 
property, interpreting the protection of property as an indirect protection of personality 
rights. Is personal injury not a more important loss in that sense than property damage? In 
Germany, the new (after the 2002 reform) para. 253 BGB uses both the term non-material 
loss (in its title) and the term ‘non-patrimonial’ loss (in the text), presumably as meaning 
the same thing.95 In a pioneering comparative study of Tort remedies, the classical German 
scholar Hans Stoll defines ‘non-patrimonial loss’ (‘Nichtvermoegensschaden’), as injury to a 
personal interest accompanied by a value loss for which there is no objective measure. Stoll 
criticises the use of the term ‘non-material loss as misconceived and unable to embrace all 
forms of non-pecuniary harm.96 Injury types of this kind that are compensated indicate 
which personal interests deserve protection in a legal order’s values, and this protection 
is closely linked to the protection of personality and develops with the extension of such 
protection. 
Under German influence, the Italian Civil code in article 2059 also speaks of non-
patrimonial loss, but doctrine and case law also use the term moral damage (danno morale) 
when referring to the loss addressed by article 2059. Important case law developments in 
Italy have introduced new terminology, danno alla salute (injury to health), or dano biologico 
(biological injury), comprising most of the heads of damage of non-pecuniary loss that are 
not included in the concept of danno morale in the sense of art 2059, as well the controversial 
new term danno esistenziale (existential injury). Similarly, Portuguese law uses the term 
‘Dano corporal-functional-biologico’ (somatic and biological97 devaluation of the person), as 
a non-pecuniary loss of tertium genus, next to the more common ‘Danos non patrimoniais’ 
(non-patrimonial losses). 
While French law still employs rather fondly the original generic term dommage moral, it 
now possesses the most detailed and advanced nomenclature, which is analysed in detail 
below. Dommage morale remains the preferred general term for non-pecuniary loss also 
in Belgian law,98 despite its otherwise sophisticated distinction between separate heads, 
which compares very favourably with the latest developments of French nomenclature. 
The Dutch Civil Code adopts the simple terminology ‘harm to the person in any other 
94 ‘Wird jemand an seinem Vermögen vorsezlich oder durch auffallende Sorglosigkeit eines Andern beschädiget; so ist er 
auch den entgangenen Gewinn, und wenn der Schade vermittelst einer durch ein Strafgesetz verbothenen Handlung, oder 
aus Muthwillen und Schadenfreude verursacht ist, den Werth der besondern Vorliebe zu fordern berechtiget’ (‘If someone 
suffers property loss because of the malice or gross negligence of another, he has an action for compensation 
of the loss of profit, and, if the loss occurs through a violation of a criminal statute, or caused by wantonness or 
malicious delight, of the value of any special preference;’).
95 The older traditional term Schmerzengeld, which was still used in the title, but not the text, of the now deleted 
old para. 847 BGB, has now been completely abandoned by the new para. 253, but is still in use in the Austrian 
Civil Code, art. 1325 ABGB. Compensation of physical pain was a very old tradition of customary German law 
long before the emergence of dommage moral in France and elsewhere: Slizyk, A (2013) Beck’sche Schmerzensgeld-
Tabelle 9th ed. Beck 2 following; for a historical commentary on para. 253 see Schmoeckel, M, Rueckert, J & 
Zimmermann, R (eds) (2007) Historisch-kritishcer Kommentar zum BGB, Band II Schuldrecht: Allgemeiner Teil, Mohr 
paras 241-432.
96 Stoll, H (1993) Haftungsfolgen supra note 48, 342.
97 Including biological harm of a psychological nature (Danos biologicos de natureza psiquica)
98 Cousy, H and Droshout, D (2001) ‘Belgium, Non-Pecuniary Loss in Belgian law’ in  Horton Rogers WV 
(ed.) Damages for Non-Pecuniary Loss in a Comparative Perspective, Tort and Insurance Law vol. 2 Vienna/New York 
Springer 30 following 
JCL 10:2           309
stathis banakas
(i.e. than pecuniary) way-‘ander nadeel’.99 The Spanish Supreme Court has been using 
interchangeably the terms daño moral or daño no patrimonial or daño extrapatrimonial, and 
in the case of personal injury authoritative authors in Spain have proposed, under the 
influence of the Italian doctrine of danno biologico, a third category, dano corporal (bodily 
injury). Dano corporal is the impairment of health or bodily or mental integrity of a human 
being, independent from the pecuniary and non-pecuniary loss that it produces. 100
Summa divisio of non-pecuniary loss
Another basic distinction recurrent in different jurisdictions, this time within the general 
head of non-pecuniary loss, is that between the injury itself followed by harm caused by 
the infliction of pain (pain & suffering) and harm caused by the deprivation of pleasure 
(loss of amenities), a distinction long established in English law.101 French law, despite its 
long commitment to the compensation of pain and suffering, has no directly corresponding 
pair of basic concepts in the now established new nomenclature Dintilhac (on which see 
details infra), which is without doubt the most advanced at the present time in Europe. 
This is mainly due to the importance given in the French nomenclature to the event of the 
medical stabilization (in French consolidation) of the victim’s injuries (when the victim’s 
condition stabilizes for the future), something unique in terms of Comparative law. Pre- 
and after-stabilisation non-pecuniary loss is, in fact, a rather original and quite unique 
summa divisio in contemporary French law. Pre-stabilisation losses are treated as temporary, 
and after-stabilisation losses, whether new or remaining losses, are treated as permanent. 
This distinction also determines the prescription of claims (starting date will normally 
be the date of such ‘consolidation’, which is determined by the medical experts), besides 
promoting clarity and precision as to what is taken into account in the non-pecuniary loss 
award. This is a distinction not to be confused with that of pre-trial and post-trial losses 
(known in several jurisdictions, including English law), or liquidated and non-liquidated 
losses. But there are bound to be cases in which the matter will need to be settled at trial, 
although if serious injuries are far from stabilised at the time of trial the court may award 
reviewable periodical payments for the future, or provisional damages (as indeed is now 
possible also in England102 and also in Germany). Stabilization of injuries is, of course, 
99 Article 6:95 BW (Burgerlijk Wetboek). An excellent account of Dutch law is Wissink, MH and van Boom, WH 
(2001) ‘The Netherlands, Non-Pecuniary Loss under Dutch Law’, in Horton Rogers, WV (ed.) Damages for Non-
Pecuniary Loss in a Comparative Perspective, Tort and Insurance Law vol. 2 Springer 155 following 
100 De Angel Yaguez, R (1993) Tratado de responsabilidad civil (Treatise of Civil Liability) Civitas 698; Vicente 
Domingo, E (1994) Los danos corporales : typologia y valoracion (corporal injuries: typology and evaluation), 
Dikynson, Barcelona 323. In addition, Spanish courts recognise pretium doloris as a separate head from daño 
extrapatrimonial. 
101 See e.g. West & Son Ltd v Shepherd [1964] AC 326
102 Provisional damages have been introduced in English law by section 32A of the Supreme Court Act 1981, 
inserted by section 6(1) of the Administration of Justice Act 1982. As Lord Hoffmann said in Rothwell, explaining 
why this statute was no help to the plaintiffs in that case, ‘This provision allows a claimant to elect for an 
award of provisional damages for the injury which he has already suffered and enables him to avoid having to 
quantify his damages for the chance of developing further injury in the future; a calculation which is likely to 
result in his being either undercompensated (if the injury occurs) or overcompensated (if it does not)… But the 
statute does not support the aggregation theory. On the contrary, its insistence that provisional damages can be 
obtained only when there is a chance that a serious disease will develop “as a result of the act or omission which 
gave rise to the cause of action” makes it clear that it applies only where the claimant has a cause of action.”: 
[2004] UKHL 41 at no. 2 per Lord Hoffmann. It is obvious that this was not a case, in his Lordship’s opinion, of 
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not always, if not only rarely, medically certain, and victims may need, and are indeed 
allowed, to return to the court if things become unexpectedly worse after trial with a new 
action, based on the new symptoms. But injurers will not be allowed to do the same if the 
condition of the victim unexpectedly improves, as they are considered as bound by the 
judgment under the principle of res judicata (autorite de la chose jugee),103 and must protect 
themselves against this eventuality, if it is more likely than not, by insisting on periodical 
payments at trial rather than accepting to pay a lump sum, as periodical payments will be 
reviewed and can be modified in the future, if necessary.
As a result of the distinction in France between pre- and after-stabilisation non-
pecuniary losses, in the nomenclature Dintilhac the head of loss known as deficit fonctionnel 
permanent (permanent functional deficit) includes souffrances (pain & suffering) and 
incapacite physique (loss of amenities), as well as the loss of quality of life; whereas the head 
of loss déficit fonctionnel temporaire (temporary, i.e. before consolidation, bodily functional 
deficit), only incudes temporary physical incapacity and temporary loss of quality of life 
(corresponding to temporary loss of amenities), and there is a distinct head of (temporary) 
souffrances endourees (corresponding to temporary pain and suffering). Permanent pain and 
suffering after stabilisation of the victim’s injuries is presumably seen as directly affecting, 
and possible to include under, the (permanent) loss of quality of life. An important role is 
played in this connection in French law by the concept of prejudice d’agrement: this includes 
special hobbies and other pleasures enjoyed by the victim and adds a pragmatic element 
to the more normative nature of loss of amenity. 
In German law too a clear dividing line between pain and suffering and loss of amenities 
does not exist, although some judicial decisions and German authors (usually versed in 
Comparative law) speak of the loss of “die Annehmlichkeiten des Lebens” (“amenities of 
life”).104 Other jurisdictions work with different divisions of non-pecuniary losses: for 
example, in Italian law the danno biologico (biological harm) or danno alla salute (harm 
to health) includes pain and suffering and the loss caused by incapacity, whereas, in a 
relatively recent decision of the Italian Supreme Court, the term pecunia lesae dignitatis was 
used to refer to the compensation of the loss of dignity of a human person, instead of the 
traditional pretium doloris.                                 
The difficulty of finding common ground of basic categorisation of non-pecuniary 
harm types is, naturally, compounded by lack of linguistic precision within jurisdictions. 
An example is again European Tort law as applied by the European Court of Justice (ECJ). 
In its Grifoni judgment105 the Court provided the following basic categorization: in English 
‘compensation for physical and non-material loss’, in French, ‘indemnisation de son prejudice 
tant biologique que moral’, and in German, ‘Ersatz sowohl seines koerperlichen als seines seelischen 
Schadens’. These can, of course, be valid as European Tort law categories, if the ECJ wishes 
an injury that has not yet fully developed, but it was a case of no injury at all.
103 See Gout, O (2011) ‘Le futur du dommage: aggrevation et amelioration’ (The future of injury : aggrevation 
and improvement) in Gazette du Palais 8-9 avril 2011 nos 98 and 99, 21.
104 Stoll, H (1993), Haftungsfolgen supra note 48, 356.
105 Alfredo Grifoni v. European Atomic Energy Community (no 1) [1990] ECR I-1203 Case C-308/87; (no 2) [1994] 
ECR I-341; see for a general commentary on this and other related cases Oliphant, K (2009) ‘European Tort Law: 
A Primer for the Common Lawyer’, in O’Cinneide, C Letsas, G Christopher Campbell-Ho, C (eds.) 62 Current 
Legal Problems, Oxford University Press 440 at 449; also Koziol, H & Schulze, R (eds.) (2008) Tort Law of the 
European Community, Wien, Springer; for Tort law in the case law of the ECHR see Fenyves, A, Karner, E, Koziol, 
H, Steiner, E (eds) (2011) Tort Law in the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights  Walter de Gruyter. 
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them to be so, without necessarily being adopted by national liability regimes, given the 
fact that, perhaps fortunately, compensation for personal injury has not yet been wholly 
harmonized in the EU. It remains, however, remarkable that the Court refused to attempt a 
convergence of existing, and laboriously developed in all jurisdiction over lengthy periods 
of time conceptual bases of the summa divisio, and decided to introduce concepts new 
(such as ‘seelischer Schaden’) or old and controversial (such as ‘non-material loss) in the 
legal terminology of the respective traditions. A reason for that may be, although this is 
doubtful, that the Court sees a need to develop a new, original nomenclature for European 
Tort law, but the language is loose and out-dated and the translation confusing.
TOPOGRAPHY AND ARCHITECTURE
The German Civil Code (Buergerliches Gesetzbuch-BGB) towers over the European 
landscape. It pays particular attention to the law of damages within a structure containing 
general principles applicable to all claims for damages, regardless of source or degree of 
liability in paras. 249-255. The law of damages is common to all sources of liability, but the 
availability of the remedy is decided according to the individual rules of each source of 
liability, for example, in the case of personal injury, by the new (post-2002) para. 253 II, and 
paras. 823 et seq., on the law of torts (unerlaubte Handlungen). Apart from the principle of 
full reparation (Totalreparation), para. 249 also introduces the principle of Naturalrestitution, 
reparation in naturam, which as a remedy takes priority over damages.106 Significantly, 
with regard to non-pecuniary losses, whereas no restriction applies to Naturalrestitution, 
when it comes to monetary compensation, described as ‘equitable107’, such compensation 
is only possible if there is an obligation to offer compensation for an injury to the body, 
health, freedom or sexual autonomy of a physical person108 (new para. 253, part 2)109. Such 
compensation has traditionally been called, since the 17th century, Schmerzensgeld (“money 
for pain”).110 The damages awarded as Schmerzensgeld have, primarily, a compensatory 
function (Ausgleichsfunktion), but satisfaction (Genugtuung) is also accepted as a secondary 
function, especially when the wrongdoer’s conduct is particularly reprehensible.111 
Significantly, the reform of the German Law of Obligations in 2002 extended the right 
of compensation for non-pecuniary harm to cases of injury caused without fault, i.e. 
strict liability. This has led to criticisms by commentators, who point out that because 
106 In contrast with the classical Roman law principle of omnis condemnatio pecuniaria est (all condemnations 
are pecuniary) (Dig 16)
107 By its nature, non-pecuniary harm is not considered able to be fully assessed and its assessment must be left 
to the fair and equitable judgment of the court: more below.
108 Para 823 I BGB imposes a general obligation of compensation in cases of injury caused by an unlawful and 
culpable invasion of these interests.
109 For a recent dogmatic analysis see Claudia Schubert (2013) Die Wiedergutmachung immaterieller Schäden im 
Privatrecht (The Restoration of non-material harm in private law) Mohr.
110 In Latin known as pecunia doloris or, in French, prix de la douleur: see for a historical comparison the 
contributions in Durant, B, Poirier J and Royer J-R (eds) (1997) La douleur et le droit (The pain and the law). As 
already mentioned, this term has been dropped from the new version of para. 253 after the reform of 2002.
111 See BGHZ (Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofs in Zivilsachen) (Decisions of the Federal Supreme Court 
in Civil law matters) 35, 363; BVerfGE (Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts) (Decisions of the Federal 
Constitutional Court) 34, 269; art. 45 of the Swiss Code of Obligations demands that monetary satisfaction is 
justified by the particular severity of the injury and fault of the tortfeasor, whereas the German Supreme Court 
treats these two conditions as alternatives: see Deutsch and Ahrens, H.-J. , supra note 37, 226.
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Genugtuung implies a punitive function for Schmerzensgeld, something which is generally 
alien to the tradition of German Civil law, it should be disregarded altogether when there 
is liability without fault (i. e. no negligence or intention), and only be taken into account 
in cases of intentional harm or gross negligence.112 This seems now to be accepted by the 
courts.113 Nevertheless, the Regional Court of Berlin (Landsgericht Berlin) in a judgment in 
2006 awarded € 3000 to a boy victim of an attack by the defendant’s dogs for stress caused 
by the behaviour of the defendant’s insurance company trying to settle by repeatedly 
offering disproportionally low amounts in settlement.114 The defendant’s liability for 
the injury caused by the dogs was strict, not based on negligence, but this did not shield 
him from liability for a non-pecuniary harm caused by the unacceptable behaviour of his 
insurers. Such unconscionable behaviour of the tortfeasor’s insurer is generally considered 
by German courts as being against the principle of good morals (gutte Sitten), a cornerstone 
in the architecture of the German Civil Code, and an aggravating factor increasing the 
tortfeasor’s liability.115
Restitution in kind is also the principal remedy under the Austrian General Civil Code 
(ABGB), para. 1323, which, however, does not distinguish between pecuniary and non-
pecuniary harm, defining damage as any harm to the property, rights or person of another. 
116 Non-pecuniary harm is compensated with damages for pain and suffering and for the 
loss of enjoyment of life caused by the injury. Unlike in Germany, in Austria such damages 
have purely a compensatory function and there is no additional function of satisfaction.117 
This approach necessitates a possibility of some ‘objectification’118 of the pain or suffering 
that must be linked, therefore, to physical injury to health. Thus the Austrian Supreme 
Court (Oberster Gerichtshof) refused to award damages for pain and suffering to the 
wife of a man that left her and their marital home to live with another woman, causing 
her psychological disturbances of a pathological nature as a result, including insomnia, 
headaches, depression and psychoses.119 The court held that appropriate remedies for the 
breakdown of a marital relationship are those of marriage and divorce law, and mere 
infidelity, or ‘loss of love’, was not sufficient to support a tort claim unless there was also 
an intention to injure the personality of the spouse (or, presumably, some physical harm 
caused to her in the process).
By contrast, the Swiss Code of Obligations (SCO), closely followed by the Greek Civil 
Code in matters of extra contractual liability,120 gives priority to the remedy of damages, 
112 Schiemann, G (2005) in Staudinger Kommentar zum Buergerlichen Gesetzbuch para 253 no 30; Palandt, O (2012) 
Buergerliches Gesetzbuch 71st ed. para. 253 no 11.
113 See Oberlandsgericht (OLG) (Court of Appeal) Saarbruecken NJW 2008, 1166, 1168.
114 Landsgericht (LG) Berlin 6 December 2006 NJW 2006, 702.
115 The victim does not have a direct claim against the insurer for the stress caused by the insurer’s behavior, 
but this behavior is taken into account in calculating the tortfeasor’s overall liability for non-pecuniary loss, 
presumably on the basis that it is the insurer who finally pays; nevertheless, this practice of German courts may 
raise interesting questions of fault and imputation, as, obviously, tortfeasors have no control over the behavior 
of their insurer, and may be negatively affected in seeking future cover by the amount of liability they incur.
116 “Schade heißt jeder Nachtheil, welcher jemanden an Vermögen, Rechten oder seiner Person zugefügt worden is” 
(“Damage means any detriment that is inflicted on someone’s property, rights or person”).
117 Karner E & Koziol, H (2003) ‘Der Ersatz ideellen Schadens im oesterreichischen Recht und seine Reform’ (The 
Compensation of ideal loss in Austrian law and its reform), Gutachten fuer den 15 OJT II/1 24 following 
118 Ibid., 23 following 
119 Oberster Gerichtshof 20 February 2003, 6 Ob 124/0, SZ 2003/16
120 Article 914 of the Greek Civil Code
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allowing exceptionally restitution in kind if possible, 121 but, interestingly, the SCO is more 
inflexible in not including non-pecuniary harm in the definition of actionable damage in 
art. 41 part 1, where it sharply distinguishes between pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses. 
Instead, non-pecuniary harm arising from a personal injury is dealt with distinctly, as 
the object of special liability in the SCO under art. 41, which sounds, in tone as well as in 
substance, more austere than para. 253 part 2 of the German BGB. Under Swiss law the 
judge can (but is not obliged), to grant equitable compensation as “moral reparation’ in 
the light of the circumstances of each particular case. 122 The emphasis on moral reparation 
(satisfaction) rather than compensation for non-pecuniary harm is a hallmark of the Swiss 
tradition followed, again, by the Greek Civil Code. By contrast, Swiss law also belongs to 
a group of European jurisdictions that do not exclude recovery of non-pecuniary harm 
suffered by close relatives of victims of personal injury, and do not limit such recovery to 
cases of fatal injuries.123 It recognises claims of indirect victims (relatives), not only in the 
case of wrongful death124 but also in cases of grave personal injury of the primary victim, 
if, according to article 49 of the Swiss Code of Obligations, ‘inherent rights are injured’.125 
The Swiss Federal Tribunal (Tribunal Federal) has held, quite sensibly, that sometimes a 
grave injury may cause more intense suffering to close relatives than death.126 Importantly, 
under a revised version of article 49 of the Swiss Code of Obligations, it is the gravity of 
the claimant’s injury, not the degree of the tortfeasor’s fault, which is the decisive factor. 
German, Austrian, Swiss, and Greek law also deny recovery when pain and suffering 
is the injury, and is not the result of a bodily injury127 or harm to personality or reputation 
or any other protected interest. Interesting in this respect is the architecture of the Dutch 
Civil Code, one of the most recent and widely acclaimed European codes. Article 6: 106, 
para. 1 of the Dutch Civil Code (Burgerlijk Wetboek-BW) allows the compensation of non-
pecuniary harm in cases where there is a violation of a person only if it was the tortfeasor’s 
intention to cause such harm, and not a general intention to injure or mere negligence, a 
provision which severely restricts the scope of compensation. However, if that intention 
is present, non-pecuniary harm can be compensated even in the absence of a medically 
121 Art. 41 section 1: “Celui qui cause, d’une manière illicite, un dommage à autrui, soit intentionnellement, soit par 
négligence ou imprudence, est tenu de le réparer” (« He who causes, in an illicit manner, a damage to another, either 
intentionally, or negligently, is held liable to compensate for it »).
122 Art. 47: “Le juge peut, en tenant compte de circonstances particulières, allouer à la victime de lésions corporelles ou, 
en cas de mort d’homme, à la famille une indemnité équitable à titre de réparation morale” (« The judge may, after 
taking into account the particular circumstances, allow an equitable compensation to the victim of personal 
injuries, or, in the case of death, to his family, under the head of moral reparation »).
123 Other members of this group are Greek, French and Portuguese law below, and also in Lithuania by the 
Supreme Court, under the new Lithuanian Civil Code of 2000. In Sweden, the Swedish Supreme Court allowed 
recovery of a mother’s pain and suffering when her son was left vacillating between life and death after a fight, 
despite having first accepted that the Swedish Tort Liability Act (ch. 5 section 2) only provides for such recovery 
when the direct victim is dead, on the basis that this was an exceptional case in which the mother’s loss could be 
seen as a ‘typical and expected consequence’, of the intentional exercise of violence by the tortfeasor. 
124 In such a case all modern jurisdictions allow claims of close relatives-dependents of the deceased, but 
not all agree on what heads of such harm are recoverable by these third parties. Wrongful death damages are 
outside the scope of this paper.
125 See also in Greece, where the law of extra-contractual liability is based on the architecture of the Swiss 
Code of Obligations, the decision of the Athens Court of Appeal 6055/1989, Archeion Nomologias 41, 776, which 
allowed the recovery of the wife’s pain and suffering caused by her husband’s car accident, which rendered 
him impotent.
126 Tribunal Federal Suisse 22 April 1986 ATF 112 II 226.
127 For the House of Lords decision in the English case of Rothwell see supra no. 3.
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recognised physical or psychological illness. In a decision of the Dutch Supreme Court 
(Hoge Raad) of 2004,128 the court held that the police who by failing to protect local residents 
from rioters caused them fear and severe insecurity feelings were liable to pay damages 
for this non-pecuniary harm. This was because there was a violation of their person, in the 
sense of article 6: 106, para. 1 BW. 
Crossing over to French law and the Romanistic tradition in the Civil law topography, 
the irresistibly simple and clear architecture of the French Civil Code is built on the principle 
that all damage falls to be compensated, irrespective of its nature, on an even keel, if the 
general conditions of civil liability are present,129 whether it is the result of a fault or, in 
the case of damage caused by a thing, without fault.130 In his pioneering study ‘L’interet 
moral dans les obligations legales’ (‘The Moral Interest in Legal Obligation”), published in 
1911, Pierre de Mallon distinguishes between what he calls ‘interet economique’ (“economic 
interest”) and ‘interet moral’ (“moral interest”) and finds no difficulty in accepting that 
they both deserve equal protection. Both are defined on the basis of the satisfaction of a 
need or the experience of a pleasure, in the case of the former through the intermediary of 
economic means, and in the case of the latter without such an intermediary, only through 
the free exercise of human faculties.131 In their ground-breaking decision of 1833,132 the 
united chambers of the Cour de Cassation affirmed the recovery of non-pecuniary harm as 
dommage moral declaring that the difficulty in its assessment should not deny the principle 
of its recovery on an equal footing as pecuniary harm. In 1923 the French Code of Criminal 
Procedure expressly refers to dommage moral as included in a crime victim’s right of action 
128 Gemeente Groningen v X, Hoge Raad (Dutch Supreme Court) 9 July 2004 (2005) NJ 391
129 This general clause applies also when damage is caused by the puissance publique, (public authority), which 
in France is subject to the separate jurisdiction of Administrative courts, headed by the Conseil d’Etat (Council 
of State); but, although the basic architecture is common, the detailed nomenclature adopted by the civil courts 
has not been so far adopted by the Conseil d’Etat in the administrative sector of civil liability: see details below.
130 Article 1382 envisages intentional harm, article 1383 introducing liability for negligence or imprudence; 
article 1384 is interpreted as providing for strict liability of the keeper (guardian) of a thing that causes damage.
131 Intérêt économique : La satisfaction d’un besoin, la réalisation d’une sensation agréable par l’intermédiaire d’un 
moyen économique, c’est-a-dire par l’usage des biens. ..tout ce qui est bon…choses matérielles ou immatérielles qui sont 
susceptibles de présenter une valeur d’échange ; (Economic interest :the satisfaction of a need, the experience of a 
pleasant sensation through the intermediary of economic means, that is to say through use of things…everything 
that is good…material or immaterial things that are susceptible to be presented as having an exchange value)
Intérêt moral : la réalisation d’une sensation agréable par le seul jeu des facultés humaines, s’exerçant librement et a 
l’occasion des personnes ou des choses, mais sans l’intermédiaire de moyens économiques, indépendamment de l’usage 
des biens’ (Moral interest : the experience of a pleasant sensation through the sole function of human faculties, 
experienced freely and in relation to persons or things, but without the intermediary of economic means, 
independently of the use of things): De Mallon, P (1911) L’intérêt moral dans les Obligations Légales’ (The moral 
interest in Legal Obligations) Caen 16.
132 Cour de Cassation, chambres réunies (Cassation Court, United Chambers), 15.06.1833, Sirey, Jurisprudence 
(1833), 458, where the Procureur général (General persecutor) Dupin strongly supported an action for non-
pecuniary harm saying : ‘celui qui agit en pareille matière, selon la belle expression romaine plaide la cause de 
la douleur : causam agit doloris’ (« He who acts in such a matter, according to the nice Roman expression pleads 
the cause of pain : brings an action for grief »). The latin expression causa doloris is common in Latin poetry 
‘neu matri miserae tanti sim causa doloris,
quae te sola, puer, multis e matribus ausa
persequitur, magni nec moenia curat Acestae.’ 
(“And don’t let me be a cause of grief to your poor mother,
my boy, who alone among many mothers dared to follow
you, without thought of staying in great Acestes’s city”): 
Vergil Aeneid IX 216
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civile (civil action) in the Criminal court.133 And the compensation of non-pecuniary harm 
(pain and suffering) of an indirect victim-close relative, when the primary victim is injured, 
was put beyond any doubt in a decision of the Cour de Cassation in 1977, which allowed 
the recovery of damages for such harm by the son of a man crippled in a car accident, 
deprived of his father’s counselling and affection.134 Such third party non-pecuniary harm 
only needs to satisfy the standard requirements of being direct,135 certain and personal, 
requirements common to the recovery of all kinds of harm. 
In Italy the rigid architecture of the Italian Civil and Criminal Codes led to a very original 
development of a new nomenclature by the courts, with the support of doctrinal writers. 
Before this development took place, the combination of articles 2059 Codice Civile (Civil 
Code) and 136 Codice Penale (criminal Code) resulted in the compensation of the victim’s 
non-pecuniary loss (‘non-patrimonial’, danno non patrimoniale) only when the injurer’s 
action was also a crime. In a ground-breaking judgment in 1986 the Italian Constitutional 
Court used article 32 of the Italian Constitution which protects health as a fundamental 
right136 to rule that an injury to health (danno alla salute) was not a non-patrimonial loss in 
the sense of article 2059 and did not fall under the restrictions of that article, but was harm 
to be generally compensated in all cases under the conditions of the general clause of article 
2043,137 on an equal footing with patrimonial loss. The Constitutional Court went, indeed, 
even further in holding that the injury to health was always the ‘first, essential, priority 
compensation that conditions every other one’.138 In turn, the Italian Supreme Court (Corte 
di Cassazione) adopted a new terminology, the term danno biologico (biological harm) in a 
consistent jurisprudence, and held that all non-pecuniary harm, biological and ‘moral’, as 
well as pecuniary harm consequential to the personal injury, must be compensated by a 
single award, based on an equitable evaluation by the judge, without any further distinction 
between different heads of damage.139 Danno biologico (biological harm) or danno alla salute 
(harm to health),140 represents a ‘reification’ of all harm resulting from personal injury, and 
133 Code de Procédure pénale (Code of Criminal Procedure) art. 3 para. 2
134 Cour de Cassation, 2e Chambre Civile (Second Civil Chamber) 23 May 1977, Revue Trimestrielle de Droit Civil 
1977, 769, observations G. Durry. In Belgium courts have compensated the pretium affectionis of the owner of a 
pet, killed or injured, so far as its existence is clearly established, although awards are very modest: see Cour 
d’Appel Mons (Court of Appeal of Mons) 24 March 1997, Revue Générale des Assurances et des Responsabilités 
1998, 12996. In this connection, a distinction is made between pretium affectionis for the loss or damage to 
inanimate things and such loss or injury to an animal. Details of Belgian law on this issue in Estienne, N (2002) 
L’évaluation judiciaire des indemnités: dommages aux choses, in Fagnart, J-L (editor) Responsabilité, Traite 
théorique et pratique Kluwer, 27.
135 An ‘indirect’ victim can suffer ‘direct’ loss: the first is a factual; the second is a normative concept.
136 ‘La Repubblica tutela la salute come fondamentale diritto dell’individuo e interesse della collettività, e garantisce cure 
gratuite agli indigenti..’ (“The Republic protects health as a fundamental right of the individual and as a collective 
interest, and guarantees free care for those without means”).
137 ‘Qualunque fatto doloso o colposo , che cagiona ad altri un danno ingiusto , obbliga colui che ha commesso il fatto a 
risarcire il danno.’ (“ Any intentional or negligent act, which causes to others unfair harm, obliges the person who 
committed it to compensate the loss.”) On the architecture of liability for non-pecuniary loss in Italian and other 
compared laws see below, next section.
138 Corte Constituzionale (Constitutional Court) 14 July 1986 no. 184 (1986) Foro Italiano I 2053 commentary by 
G. Ponzanelli.
139 See, Corte di Cassazione 31 May 2003 no 8827, Giurisprudenza Italiana 2003, 29 with a note by M. Suppa; but 
a more recent decision of the Corte di Cassazione seems now to recognize that non-pecuniary harm could be 
divided into pain and suffering and loss of quality of life: see more details below.
140 The extensive case law linked to the development of these new concepts is discussed in Bargagna, M and 
Busnelli, F (eds) (1995) La valutazione del danno alla salute 3rd ed. Padova CEDAM, and Bargagna, M and Busnelli, 
F (eds) (1996) Rapporto sullo stato della giurispudenza in material di danno alla salute Padova, CEDAM.
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is, in that sense, a term without equivalent in other jurisdictions. Following this dramatic 
development, the old nomenclature of patrimonial and non-patrimonial loss embedded in 
the Italian civil code has been radically altered. Firstly, danno alla salute-danno biologico is 
a new head in the list of compensated loss, and the list includes, secondly, the head other 
patrimonial loss and, thirdly, the non-patrimonial loss foreseen in article 2059, which is 
now confined to danno morale, described as a ‘subjective pretium doloris characterized by a 
temporary, fundamentally transient, psychological upset’ (now including danno alla salute 
of a third party, caused by suffering from a death of a relative).141 Compensation of the first 
two is not subject to the restrictions of article 2059, and it is not limited to cases when the 
injurer’s action is also a crime, but the compensation of the third still is. More recently, the 
Corte di Cassazione qualified this third loss type as pecunia lesae dignitatis compensation of 
injury to dignity), a compensation of the harm to the dignity of a physical person (dignita 
delle persone fisiche).142 Furthermore, the compensation of the danno alla salute-danno biologico 
must be assessed on the basis of nationally applied functional incapacity scales-points 
(tabelle), whereas the danno non-patrimoniale-morale calls for an equitable compensation 
according to the judge’s fair and reasonable assessment of the individual victim’s moral 
suffering. The former is clearly seen as a sui generis loss of a double pecuniary and non-
pecuniary nature, capable of economic assessment, whereas the latter as a pure non-
pecuniary loss that cannot be objectively evaluated in monetary terms. The build-up of case 
law in Italy in recent years has, however, further blurred the originally rather clear vision 
of the architecture of the Civil Code, especially with the emergence of claims for so-called 
‘existential’ harm143 (danno esistenziale), which seems to be injury to feelings, emotions or 
disturbances of normal life not linked to any physical or psychological injury.144 This new 
head of damage was dismissed by the Corte di Cassazione in a judgment of 2008, only to be 
resurrected in a different form by the same court in a decision of last year.145
Closer to France remains Spain, where the Supreme Court has ruled more than a 
century ago that recoverable loss from a tortious act under art. 1902 Codigo Civil146 freely 
includes non-pecuniary loss (daño moral or daño no patrimonial or daño extrapatrimonial), 
as well as pecuniary loss (daño patrimonial).147 Such loss may be presumed if personal 
injury is proved, much as general damages in the common law do not need to be pleaded 
or proved.148 Writers define daño moral as the amount of loss of utility that cannot be 
141 Corte Constituzionale, 27 October 1994, no. 372 Giustizia Civile I, 3035, 1994, with commentary by Busnelli, F.
142 Cassazione civile, Sez. III, 28 November 1996 no. 10606, Responsabilità civile e Previdenza, 1997 p. 393, case 
comment E. Navaretta.
143 Supported by a number of scholars led by Professor Glendon from Trieste.
144 This new head of damage proved particularly popular with small claim courts, (Giudice di Pace, Justice of 
Peace), with single judges showing sympathy for everyday frustrations suffered by their fellow citizens: e.g. 
Giudice di Pace of Palermo, 17 May 2004, awarded damages for danno esistenziale to a bride whose wedding shoe 
broke into pieces on her wedding day.
145 See details below
146 Which is similar to article 1382 of the French Civil Code, on which see supra
147 The matter was put beyond doubt by a famous decision in 1912 of the Spanish Supreme Court (Tribunal 
Supremo) Sentencias del Tribunal Supremo (Decisison of the Supreme Court) (STS) 6th December 1912, [Roj 
(Repertorio Oficial de Jurisprudencia): STS 142/1912] 
148 It is standard court practice in cases of personal injury to presume non-pecuniary loss. In certain other 
specific cases of injury of personality rights, such a presumption is introduced by legislation, for example, 
legislation for the protection of reputation and personal and family life, Ley Organica (LO) 1/1982 de 5 mayo 
1982, de proteccion civil del derecho al honor, a la intimidad personal y familiar y la propia imagen (civil protection of 
reputation and personal and family life and one’s own image). But proof of the victim’s unconscious state by the 
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directly evaluated in money, after any kind of injury that causes recoverable damage. In 
particular, recoverable damage includes: (a) the corporal harm (dano corporal) that can be 
evaluated medically and objectively, (b) specific personal losses, such as loss of various 
amenities, verified medically but subjectively assessed, and (c) dano moral stricto sensu, 
such as mental suffering, pain, anxiety, grief or sorrow, not amounting to a medical 
illness.149 In a judgment of the Spanish Supreme Court of 2000, this last category of dano 
moral seems to have been broadened to include harm akin to the Italian danno esistenziale: 
the Court awarded damages for the inconvenience, stress and discomfort suffered by the 
claimant because of the long delay of the return flight from his honeymoon.150 This places 
Spain at the top end of jurisdictions with broad definitions of recoverable non-pecuniary 
harm. But it is important to note a significant separate development in Spain that has 
considerably dented the simple architecture of the Codigo Civil.151 Special traffic accident 
compensation legislation, largely dictated by the car insurance industry, imposes tables of 
indemnification on the courts that do not distinguish between non-pecuniary loss, such as 
pain and suffering, and pecuniary loss, such as loss of earnings, all included in the unitary 
values of the tables and capped.152
In contrast to Spain, Portuguese law is closer to the Germanic architecture, also based 
on the importance of legally protected interests. Danos non patrimoniais (non-patrimonial 
harm) are reparable only if they deserve legal protection on grounds on their severity. 
Article 496 of the Portuguese Civil Code states that ‘(1) for the assessment of compensation 
regard must be had to serious non-pecuniary damage which therefore deserves the 
protection of the law’.153 Unlike in the case of German law, where the compensation 
architecture is based on a specific typology of non-pecuniary harm provided by the law, 
the Portuguese approach allows more judicial discretion within the parameters of ‘serious’ 
non-pecuniary harm. When deemed serious enough to be recoverable, non-pecuniary loss 
is subject to an equitable assessment taking into account the degree of fault, the economic 
situation of both parties and other relevant circumstances.154 Significantly, if the defendant 
tortfeasor may affect the quantum of such damages, principally, by deducting damages for pain and suffering: 
see supra and infra.
149 See Martin-Casals, M (2002), ‘Hacia un baremo europeo para la indemnizacion de los danos corporals? 
(Is there a European standard for the compensation of personal injuries?)’ in Consideraciones generales sobre 
el Proyecto Busnelli-Lucas (general considerations on the project Busnelli-Lucas) Revista de Derecho Patrimonial 
(RDPat)  19
150 Sentencia del Tribunal Supremo STS 31 May 2000, RJ (Repertorio de Jurisprudencia) 2000/5089. This claim was 
based on a breach of contract but the Court’s ruling applies equally to Tort claims. Such contract claims for loss 
of enjoyment of holiday are also allowed by more restrictive regimes, such as English or German law.
151 See de Angel Yaguez, R (1995) Algunas previsions sobre el future de la responsabilidad civil (con especial atencion a 
la reparacion del dano) (Some predictions on the future of civil liability, with special reference to the compensation 
of loss), Civitas 147.
152 The controversial Road Traffic Liability Act of 2004 (Ley de Responsabilidad Civil y Seguro en la Circulación de 
Vehículos a Motor, 8/2004, de 29 de octobre) product of pressure from the insurance industry lobby, provides for 
a unitary assessment of both pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses in cases of personal injury resulting from a 
traffic accident, not related to the actual loss of the victim, and has been much criticised by scholars who have 
doubted its constitutionality and fairness: see Prieto, P (1996) ‘Sobre la inconstitucionalidad del sistema para la 
valoracion de danos personales de la Ley de Responsabilidad Civil y Seguro en la Circulación de Vehículos a Motor’ (On 
the unconstitutionality of the system of evaluating personal injuries of the law on Civil Liability and Insurance 
in the circulation of motor vehicles) AJA (Actualidad Juridica Aranzadi) no. 245 p. 4. 
153 Translation provided in K. Oliphant, K & Steininger, B C (2011) European Tort Law: Basic Texts A Pereira 204 
following.
154 Articles 494 and 496 (3) of Portuguese Civil Code.
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is insured the second of these criteria is not taken into account when the victim pursues the 
claim directly against the insurer,155 the latter not being, obviously, on an equal economic 
footing.156 As is the case with French and Swiss law,157 Portuguese law also recognises 
third-party non-pecuniary harm from the personal injury of a very close relative, such as 
a spouse.158 
Although liability for intentional physical harm (trespass to the person), was as recently 
as at the time of Pollock considered by this great light of English law as primarily punitive, 
after Donoghue v Stevenson it became clear that liability can also be civil, compensatory, 
also in Negligence. The law of assessment of personal injury damages developed 
independently of any general principle or structure of the law damages in general, such as 
the general principles found in the Germanic tradition, particularly the General Part of the 
BGH. Non-pecuniary harm from personal injury has been treated always as a recoverable 
loss in this development, and the case law has adopted working categories of such harm 
as shown below. English law, like French law and unlike German law, does not place non-
pecuniary harm in a special category of harm only exceptionally compensated, but unlike 
French law has no declared intention of always compensating it whatever its source or 
manifestation. In a quasi incremental development of precedent the current position is as 
stated in the leading treatise McGregor on Damages, recently endorsed by the Court of 
Appeal, as described in more detail below. This shows that specific types of non-pecuniary 
harm have been compensated in connection with specific torts and are exclusive to these. 
Thus, loss of amenity and pain and suffering, together with the newly established category 
of loss of congenial employment are exclusive to personal injury, loss of inconvenience 
and discomfort to the tort of nuisance, social discredit to the tort of defamation, while loss 
of enjoyment of a holiday has been compensated both as a result of a personal injury159 and 
a breach of contract.160 The view by English judges of non-pecuniary harm from personal 
injury is objective,161 not functional or normative, so there is no scope for the development 
of a notion of ‘somatic’ or ‘biological’ harm as a distinct category, as in Italian law. 
Personal injury is a distinct separate damages category in Scandinavian jurisdictions, 
the other two categories being damage to property and economic loss. All Scandinavian 
countries have autonomous Civil Liability statutes that are not part of a broader systematic 
codification of civil law, and these statutes provide specifically for the compensation of 
pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses arising from personal injury or death in a prescriptive 
way, intended, significantly, to discourage the further development of the nomenclature. 
In the case of non-pecuniary losses emphasis is placed on pain and suffering, and special 
provision is made for the harm to the feelings of the victim of an attack to their “freedom, 
155 See STJ (Supremo Tribunal de Justiça) 29 February 2000, Sumarios de Acordaos Civeis-Edicao Annual 2000, 70.
156 The interesting question whether this makes good economic sense cannot be pursued here.
157 See also art. 10:301 (1) of the Principles of European Tort Law.
158 In a case, familiar also in these two other jurisdictions, in which the wife of a seriously crippled man in an 
accident was allowed damages of € 40000 for her loss in being left to live the life of a widow without actually 
being one, including the loss of sexual relations with her husband: STJ, 8 March 2005, in Geraldes, A (2007), 
Temas de Responsabilidade Civil, II, Indemnizacao de Dano Reflexos (Themes of Civil Liability, compensation of 
losses by reflection), Almedina.
159 Ichard v Frangoulis [1977] 1 WLR 556
160 Jarvis v Swan Tours [1972] 3 WLR 954 (CA)
161 See West v Shephard [1964] A. C. 326, and the excellent discussion of these three approaches in Ogus, A 
(1972), ‘Damages for Loss of Amenities: for a Foot, a Feeling or a Function?’ (35) Modern Law Review 1.
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peace, honour or person”. The Danish and Norwegian legislation seems more restrictive, 
with compensation limited to those two types of non-pecuniary harm, whereas the 
Swedish provides for the compensation of three heads of non-pecuniary losses: “defect 
and detriment”, which refers to permanent disability (loss of faculties and amenities), 
“pain and suffering”, seen as dealing with more transient discomfort and “specific 
disadvantages” for harm that cannot be classified under the previous two headings162. 
DETAILED NOMENCLATURES UNDER THE SPOTLIGHT
The need of adopting some method of separating heads of reparable damage and of 
following a more or less detailed nomenclature has been felt in most, if not all, contemporary 
jurisdictions, as judges are keen to show that they do not just grab a total figure of non-
pecuniary loss from the air, so to speak, but do take into account in a consistent way 
separate loss types and add up the sums in order to achieve the final figure. That said, 
judges in all jurisdictions are all the same keen to emphasize that in order to achieve the 
almost universal goal of full compensation, they reserve the right to find the total greater 
or smaller than its parts and the final damages award is almost everywhere made as one 
general award for non-pecuniary loss. A good example of a widely held common position 
is that of the position of English law to the issue of the relationship of nomenclature and 
final damages award. Although both Parliament and courts, as well as legal practitioners, 
make use of different loss types in important ways and in order to advise victims more 
thoroughly on all possible aspects of their claim, the orthodox view prevailing still today is 
that all non-pecuniary loss must finally be compensated in a total sum of general damages, 
not broken down in its constituent parts, unless absolutely necessary, as in the case of the 
unconscious plaintiff when damages for pain and suffering and loss of amenity must be 
clearly distinguished.163 In assessing the total award the judge must, however, start from 
apportioning a value to the various injuries and categories and related claims fixing a 
figure for each of them, and then stand back and look at the aggregate figure and consider 
if, as a total, represents a reasonable amount for the totality of the injury claim.164  As an 
English judge put it recently: 
“It is in my judgment always necessary to stand back from the compilation of 
individual figures, whether assistance has been derived from comparable cases or 
from the JSB165 guideline advice, to consider whether the award for pain, suffering 
and loss of amenity should be greater than the sum of the parts in order properly to 
reflect the combined effect of all the injuries upon the injured person’s recovering 
quality of life or, on the contrary, should be smaller than the sum of the parts in 
order to remove an element of double counting. In some cases, no doubt a minority, 
no adjustment will be necessary because the total will properly reflect the overall 
pain, suffering and loss of amenity endured. In others, and probably the majority, 
an adjustment and occasionally a significant adjustment may be necessary”.166 
162 Swedish Tort Liability Act ch. 5 section 1.
163 Because only the latter are compensated in such a case: see West v Shepherd and more below.
164 See, for example, Sadler v Filipiak & Another [2011] EWCA Civ 1728 at no. 2, per Etherton LJ
165 Judicial Studies Board, now Judicial College
166 [2011] EWCA Civ 1728 at no. 34 per Pitchford LJ.
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This holistic conception of non-pecuniary loss is shared by French and German law 
and other major jurisdictions, and, in the case of the common law, is ingrained in the 
common law history of general damages as damages ‘at large’ that need not be specifically 
claimed or pleaded. It may be explained in different ways, both practical and ideological. 
One argument in favour may be that it is less open to the commodification criticism, as 
at the end of the day the judge has the freedom to determine an overall sum for non-
pecuniary loss according to his or her conscience and reasonable judgment, not bound 
by price-tags for injuries and categories of harm, but only guided by nomenclatures and 
compensation guidelines or tables, such as the Schmerzengeldtabellen in Germany, or in 
England maxima set and reviewed by the Court of Appeal, the Judicial College guidelines 
and the recording of awards in similar cases in Kemp & Kemp, for reasons of uniformity 
and relative certainty.
All this does not mean, of course, that nomenclatures and compensation tables are 
not necessary to make possible a meaningful discourse between victims, injurers, third 
party payers, including insurers, and, last but not least, lawyers, legislators and judges, as 
they are the only way to achieve certainty and uniformity and in order to help avoid not 
only the under-compensation, but, also, the overcompensation of the victim, when heads 
of damage are not properly defined and are confused. Thus the French Cour de Cassation 
despite its strong commitment to the principle of full compensation (reparation integrale) 
which dictates that the overall amount, according to the judge’s fair and reasonable 
assessment, covers holistically all the victim’s injuries and losses, has insisted that different 
heads of loss must not be confused in the judgment, for example, in one case, the aesthetic 
or disfigurement loss (prejudice esthetique) with pain and suffering (souffrances). Because 
of all the above reasons, reasonably clear, workable nomenclatures are everywhere 
considered very desirable, and the issue has also attracted the consistent interest of the EU 
and Council of Europe Institutions in promoting a clarification and systematic definition 
of nomenclatures of personal injury damages.167 But little significant progress has been 
made in this direction in European law and also in most national jurisdictions, with the 
notable exception of France. 
In France the pressure to modernise and clearly map the nomenclature, particularly of 
non-pecuniary harm, had been building up in the light of the importance of the solidarity 
principle in French political and social life, producing a need to identify more clearly those 
heads of damage for which Social Security agencies could be reimbursed for benefits paid to 
personal injury victims.168 In principle, social security benefits were intended to indemnify 
167 See for example the Council of Europe Resolution on Compensation for Physical Injury or Death, Resolution 75-7 
of 14 mars 1975. Interestingly, the Council’s recommendation adopts a generic nomenclature of: “préjudice 
esthétique, douleurs physiques et souffrances psychiques” (esthetic harm, physical pains and psychological 
sufferings) (nos. 11-13). In a separate development, a group of specialists was formed under the auspices of 
the European Parliament to look into the possibility of harmonizing European nomenclatures and insurance 
regimes for traffic accidents, under the chairmanship of Professor Francesco Busnelli, in which the author of this 
paper took part as an expert on English law. The group issued a declaration in its final meeting at the Academy 
of European Law in Trier, Germany, in 2000, which resulted in an European Parliament Proposal of a Draft 
Disability Scale in 2003: see Groutel, H (2000) La rationalisation de l’appréciation médico-légale des préjudices non 
économiques (The rationalisation of the medico-legal assessment of non-economic injuries) Responsabilité civile 
et assurances Repères. 
168 On the specific issue of recoupment of social security benefits, in England the Social Security (Recovery of 
Benefits) Act 1997 opts for the approach of ‘listed’ benefits (in Sch. 2, Col 2) leaving little for the courts to do (but 
see Rand v East Dorset Health Authority (no 2) [2001] PIQR Q1), and does not need to rely on a jurisprudential 
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pecuniary losses and not what were seen as ‘personal’ non-pecuniary losses (such as pain 
and suffering and the like), but the old head of damage, known for decades as ‘Incapacité 
Permanente Partielle’ (IPP) (Partial Permanent Incapacity),169 included all the consequences 
of incapacity, both pecuniary and non-pecuniary, and contributed to a significant degree 
to the uncertainty in this area. The need for a new more detailed and clearer nomenclature 
led to several reform proposals, most notably by groups chaired by Professor Lambert-
Faivre and Judge Dintilhac,170 a judge of the Cour de Cassation charged with the task of 
coordinating a working group mandated by the Ministry of Justice. The recommendations 
of this working group aimed at a methodical classification that would reassemble the 
different heads of damage were behind an important legislative reform of social security 
law that took place in 2006. 171 This legislation introduced a new principle on social security 
benefit reimbursements, according to which reimbursement claims by subrogation of 
social security organisations against third parties (tortfeasors and their insurers) must be 
exercised ‘head by head’ (‘poste par poste’) and only for those payments to the victim that 
compensate losses for which social security bodies had assumed responsibility, excluding 
losses of a “personal character” (“à l’exclusion des préjudices à caractère personnel”).172 Tidying 
up the finances of social security organisations had, therefore, the considerable side effect 
of revolutionising the nomenclature of personal injury heads of damage, described by an 
eminent French expert as a ‘Copernican revolution’.173 When recent legislation obliged the 
courts to detail all heads of damage in their awards the ‘nomenclature Dintilhac’ came 
handy and was quickly endorsed by the Cour de Cassation after a simple circular of the 
French Ministry of Justice.174 
Before taking a closer look at the nomenclature Dintilhac, it is worth pointing out that 
the need for some general categorisation of compensating personal injury loss was also 
felt by English law, which first, unlike American law, abandoned the general practice of 
using juries to assess ‘damages at large’ in 1966,175 and then, four years later, in Jefford v 
development of an appropriate nomenclature, as in the case of the legislation in France.
169 Measured according to the degree of incapacity, from minor to almost complete.
170 Rapport Lambert-Faivre sur l’Indemnisation du dommage corporel, Octobre 2003 (Report Lambert-Faivre on the 
compensation of personal injury, October 2003),<http://www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/ezexalead/search?Se
archText=LambertFaivre+&cat%5BGroupeThematique%5D=&n=slDocFrancaise>(Retrieved 13.08.2015); rapport 
Dintilhac en vue de l’élaboration d’une nomenclature des préjudices corporels), juillet 2005 (Report Dintilhac with a 
view of elaborating a nomenclature of personal injuries, July 2005), <http://www.ladocumentationfrancaise.
fr/rapports-publics/064000217-rapport-du-groupe-de-travail-charge-d-elaborer-une-nomenclature-des-
prejudices > (Retrieved 13.08.2015)
171 Loi n° 2006-1640 du 21 décembre 2006. 
172 Loi n° 2006-1640 du 21 décembre 2006 was meant to deal with general issues of the financing of social 
security but almost accidentally, as this was not originally its intention, this law introduced a new article 25 
in the Social Security Code, modifying articles 31 of Loi du 5 juillet 1985 and Loi 376-1 C. séc. soc. : “Les recours 
subrogatoires des caisses contre les tiers s’exercent poste par poste sur les seules indemnités qui réparent des préjudices 
qu’elles ont pris en charge, à l’exclusion des préjudices à caractère personnel” (”The subrogatory claims by social 
security authorities against third parties are exercised head by head with regard only to payments for harm that 
have been made, and exckuding harm of a personal nature”) .
173 Pierre, P (2013), ‘La nomenclature des préjudices extrapatrimoniaux – Etat actuel du droit français’ (The 
nomenclature of non-patrimonial losses-Current state of French law) p. 1 (unpublished, copy on file).
174 Circulaire de la Chancellerie du 25 février 2007 (Circular of the Chencellery, 25 February 2007); See Cour de 
Cassation. 2ème chambre civile, (Secnd civil Chamber), 28 mai 2009, n° 08-16829, Responsabilité civile et assurances 
2009. commentaire 202, adopting several definitions of heads of damage proposed by the nomenclature Dintilhac. 
175 Ward v James [1966] 1 QB 273 (CA): The reason was, according to Lord Denning MR (t p. 29), that leaving the 
damages at large to the jury does not achieve the desirable goals of accessibility, uniformity and predictability 
of damages for personal injury victims.
Non-Pecuniary Loss in Personal Injury
322 JCL 10:2
Gee176 adopted a clear distinction between three general heads of damage, which the judges 
ought to distinguish in assessing damages in personal injury cases: (1) Accrued pecuniary 
loss; (2) Non-pecuniary loss; (3) Loss of future earnings. This official nomenclature had 
previously being enriched with a sub-division of non-pecuniary loss damages in damages 
for pain and suffering and damages for loss of amenity.177 Pain and suffering is understood 
in English law as referring to individual, personal, grief, distress discomfort and anxiety, 
including the so-called litigation anxiety and distress caused by the knowledge of a 
shortened life-expectancy. Loss of amenity is understood objectively as loss of physical 
integrity and human dignity of a complete person, including what is shown under the 
circumstances to be special, subjective, amenity losses, such as the loss of enjoyment of 
a particular activity, like playing a musical instrument, or the loss of an enjoyment of a 
sport.178 Furthermore, damages for non- pecuniary harm may be seen as a gift to the victim, 
in the sense that no deduction of collateral benefits is allowed and no regard to the use of the 
money by the victim is paid. The Judicial College guidelines address a detailed ontology 
of types of harm, injuries and other conditions under the general head of non-pecuniary 
loss, and the case law has added a new head of damage to the nomenclature, the loss of 
congenial employment arising from a personal injury. This loss was said by a judge to be 
“well-recognised as a separate head of damage” ,179 and the leading reference work on the 
English law of Damages concedes that the courts regard it as a non-pecuniary loss separate 
from the loss of amenities.180 Additionally, unwanted pregnancy now seen as a personal 
injury181 represents a new head of non-pecuniary loss leading to the compensation of the 
birth of an unwanted child.182 But if the nomenclature for non-pecuniary losses arising 
from personal injuries recognised by courts in England is currently restricted to three 
heads of damage (or four, with the addition of birth of an unwanted child loss,): pain and 
suffering, loss of amenities and loss of congenial employment, it is important to note that 
a broader nomenclature applies across the spectrum of Tort liability for non-pecuniary 
losses, beyond those arising from a personal injury stricto sensu, officially endorsed in the 
latest case of Simmons v Castle & Others,183 by a top-heavy Court of Appeal.184 The Court of 
176 [1970] 2 QB 130 (CA)
177 Because of the former not being available to an unconscious victim: See more below. There is still no clear 
distinction in English law between loss of amenity as the loss of a faculty and loss of amenity as the loss of 
enjoyment of faculty.
178 Pain is more personal, pleasure is more universal!
179 See Hale v London Underground [1993] P. I. Q. R. Q30 at Q 39, Otton J.
180 McGregor on Damages (2009) 18th edition, London, no. 35-270. This loss is also compensated in, among other 
jurisdictions, German law, but not as a separate head of damage: see among the cases Oberlandsgericht Koeln, 
Versicherungsrecht 1992, 714; Muenchener Kommentar zum Buergerlichen Gesetzbuch (2007) Band 2 Para 241-432, 
5th ed. Para. 253 no. 41 486. German courts also compensate the change of school by the victim because of their 
injuries: see Oberlandsgericht Hamm OLG Rechtsprechung 1999, 256; Muenchener Kommentar zum Buergerlichen 
Gesetzbuch Band 2 Para 241-432 id. 
181 As McGregor supra, note 180, at 35-271, seems to accept. However, it is submitted that it is better seen as a 
violation of private autonomy and not stricto sensu personal injury, as is clear from the judgments of the House 
of Lords in the leading case of Rees v Darlington Memorial Hospital NHS Trust [2004] 1 A.C. 309. The issue cannot 
be fully discussed here, but such a view is consistent with a more conservative common law ideology that 
would be reluctant to expand remedies in the absence of physical corporal impact generally for violations of the 
right to private autonomy (despite the clear direction to the contrary by the Human Rights Act 1998). As already 
mentioned, unwanted pregnancy is seen as the mother’s personal injury in German law: supra.
182 Set in Rees v Darlington Memorial Hospital NHS Trust (above) at the “conventional” sum of £15000.
183 [2012] EWCA Civ 1288
184 The Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales, the Master of the Rolls and the Vice-President of the Civil 
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Appeal referred to the nomenclature used in the classic treatise McGregor on Damages,185 
recognising non-pecuniary losses from all torts as being of five kinds: (i) pain and suffering, 
(ii) loss of amenity, (iii) physical inconvenience and discomfort, (iv) social discredit, and 
(v) mental distress. There is no mention of congenial employment as a separate head of 
damage in cases of personal injury and we must assume that for the Court of Appeal in 
Simmons this head is subsumed to that of loss of amenities. 
Returning to the nomenclature Dintilhac, which, because it is unique in its scope and 
detail in Europe and therefore ground breaking, deserves a more lengthy analysis, two 
general features need to be underlined: First, the basic distinction between temporary 
and permanent non-pecuniary losses, i.e. losses suffered before and after the medical 
stabilization of the victim’s injuries, discussed earlier. The obvious advantage of the 
distinction for the victim must be that such losses can be proved with greater certainty and 
accuracy than (future) permanent losses over which payers have may have more room 
for dispute. Secondly, the nomenclature Dintilhac has been intentionally left incomplete, 
to allow the courts to add new heads of damage as they see fit in the exercise of their 
sovereign power to apply the basic principle of full compensation (reparation integrale).186 
A third feature of the Dintilhac nomenclature is that is more detailed in setting 
out of both types and methods of assessment of non-pecuniary losses, than any other 
anywhere else in Europe or beyond. It also addresses with a certain degree of boldness 
the controversial issue of the extent to which compensation for non-pecuniary loss can be 
assessed on a normative, objective or functional, personal basis. The Dintilhac list starts 
with the “temporary functional deficit” (“déficit fonctionnel temporaire” (DFT). This is the 
temporary invalidity, partial or total, including all the consequences of the invalidity 
suffered by victims in their private lives, before the stabilization of their injuries and 
including the time of hospitalisation, the loss of quality of life and usual pleasures of 
normal life during the traumatic illness.187 Usual pleasures of life include the temporal 
Division of the Court of Appeal This was done in a consented appeal in which the main issue an increase by 10% 
of the amount of awards for personal injury and other damages from 1st April 2013, to facilitate implementation 
of the new legislation on litigation funding which removed the obligation of the losing party in personal injury 
litigation to pay the fee of the successful lawyer of the other party in conditional fee agreements, thus burdening 
the successful claimants’ damages awards, which needed as a result to be increased by 10% to restore fairness, 
according to the author of the report behind the legislation..
185 18th edition, supra note 180, ch. 3.
186 An important limitation of the nomenclature Dintilhac lies in the fact that, under the French system of a 
separate regime of administrative civil liability, subject to the administrative jurisdiction headed by the Council 
of State (Conseil d’Etat), it only applies to claims under the jurisdiction of the civil courts, and not claims that 
need to be submitted to the Administrative courts. Significantly, the Council of State has refused to follow this 
nomenclature: see Conseil d’Etat, avis du 4 juin 2007, Lagier, n° 303422 et 304214, JCP (Jurisclasseur periodique) 
Sommaire 2007, 1840, note G. Vachet. The Supreme Administrative Court insists in applying its own more limited 
nomenclature, recognizing the following heads of damage: recognized pecuniary losses are health expenses, 
expenses related to a handicap, loss of earnings, professional and educational consequences of the injury and 
other pecuniary losses linked to the injury. Recognized non-pecuniary losses continue to be compensated under 
a general head of damage or, in certain cases, by a classification more reduced than that used by civil courts, 
such as “physical and moral suffering” (souffrances physiques et morales), aesthetic loss (préjudice esthétique) and 
the troubles of everyday existence (troubles dans les conditions d’existence)considered independently from their 
pecuniary consequences. Thus victims of injuries caused by administrative employees (e.g. in public hospitals) 
may be treated differently and less favorably than victims of actions of private persons. This has been duly 
noted by commentators in France, who rightly point out that this discrimination is unfair for the victims, who 
cannot, of course, always choose where and by whom they are injured!
187 This is the definition of the DFT by the Cour de Cassation: Cass. 2e civ. (Second Civil Chamber) 28 mai 2009 
no. 16829, Responsabilite civile et assurances 2009, commentaire 202, Revue Trimestrielle de Droit Civil 2009, 534, note 
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loss of enjoyment by the victim until the time of stabilization of the injuries of a special 
recreational activity, sport or hobby known as ‘prejudice d’agrement’ (see below).188 It is 
clear that in nominating the basic non-pecuniary loss ‘functional deficit’, the Dintilhac 
nomenclature favours a functional quasi-scientific method of assessment by experts rather 
than a normative-objective method leaving the evaluation of this loss to the judge, as is the 
case in English law and certain other jurisdictions.189 Next in the list of temporary losses 
is the head “suffering” (souffrances endurees), which covers the physical, psychological and 
moral suffering before the stabilization of the injuries.190 This is graded on a scale of 1 to 
7, again, by an expert. In specifying what is included under this head of damage, and as 
is generally the case with all injury types, French case law offers the richest florilegium of 
the judicially recognized ontology of suffering in Europe: including not only pain, anxiety, 
distress and the like, but also fear (for example, after a plane crash or a rape), and behavioral 
problems of isolation, avoidance, self-immersion, feelings of revenge or rebellion caused 
by the injury. It is significant to note again that suffering resulting from sexual or other 
assaults has to be pleaded and indemnified in detail (poste par poste), and that a general 
single claim for moral damage (prejudice moral) resulting from such an assault, is no longer 
acceptable.191 Importantly, this head of damage, which evidently corresponds to the pain 
and suffering loss type in English law, merges with the ‘permanent functional deficit’ after 
the stabilization of the victim’s injuries, and ceases to be a distinct head of damage. 
Third in the French nomenclature of temporary non-pecuniary harm is the ‘temporary 
aesthetic harm”, referring to the change of the physical appearance of the victim between 
the injury and settlement or adjudication, also graded on a scale of 1 to 7 by an expert. This 
loss type particularly exemplifies the difficulty of keeping loss types separate in order to 
avoid overcompensating the victim, as it is possible that any disfigurement or aesthetic 
harm may impact on other heads of damage, such as the professional (earnings) loss, the 
functional deficit (for example, loss of one’s voice, use of crutches) or the victim’s sexual 
or family life and recreational activities,192 which as seen below are considered separate 
heads of the nomenclature. Detailed nomenclatures can indeed have this effect of separate 
heads of damage intersecting and creating a risk of overcompensation, which is rather 
embarrassing as this was a risk that the adoption of a detailed nomenclature was intended 
to avoid in the first place. Ontologically, temporary aesthetic harm includes not only 
the disfigurement itself, but also such harm as that of the victim’s self-perception being 
P. Jourdain.
188 There is no separate head in the nomenclature Dintilhac for such temporary loss, but if after the injuries 
are stabilized such a loss remains, it is recognised as a separate head of permanent loss. This seems sensible, 
as the temporary inability to enjoy a hobby that ceases after treatment and stabilization can be seen as difficult 
to assess on its own. Nevertheless, the Cour de Cassation, in its concern to uphold the fundamental principle 
of full compensation (reparation integrale), has insisted that a separate head of ‘prejudice d’agrement temporaire’ 
(temporary loss of enjoyment), should be recognised by the courts, contrary to the line taken by Dintilhac.
189 See Ogus supra note 161; this French technique is in line with previous practice, when the IPP was also 
measured ‘scientifically’ (“au point”)
190 Le Roy, M, Le Roy J-D, and Bibal, F, (2013) L ‘Evaluation du Préjudice Corporel (The evaluation of personal 
injury) 19th ed. LexisNexis 123 
191 See Gazette du Palais, 9 & 10 juillet 2009, dossier spécial, ‘l’indemnisation des victimes de violences sexuelles’ 
(Special file : the compensation of victims of sexual violence).
192 As, for example, if the victim does not dare to wear a swimming suit anymore and is, therefore, deprived of 
the pleasure of swimming (which would normally fall to be considered under the head of ‘prejudice d’agrement’, 
on which see below)
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diminished, or the change of the aesthetic habits of a sexually assaulted woman. It is a 
loss type that can be more significant as temporary loss, before stabilization of the victim’s 
medical condition, than permanent. And it is highly subjective, both in duration and in 
terms of characteristics and personal circumstances of the victim, including age, gender, 
occupation, social and professional habits and the like.193 
Moving on to future, permanent losses, the list Dintilhac confines the compensation of 
the ‘permanent functional deficit’ (“déficit fonctionnel permanent” (DFP), to the physiological 
only consequences of the incapacity caused by the injury, to the exclusion of all pecuniary 
(‘patrimonial’) consequences, such as future loss of earnings or professional losses, unlike 
the previously used head of loss known as IPP (incapacite partielle permanente-permanent 
partial incapacity). This was, besides, the main reason for which a new nomenclature was 
needed, as already discussed above. Thus damages awarded for permanent functional 
deficit are not subject to deduction on account of social security benefits paid for the 
invalidity, which are now clearly to be seen as aiming at the compensation of pecuniary 
consequences only. This is a position, with which English law and several other jurisdictions 
broadly, but not so clearly, agree.194 As before Dintilhac, the evaluation of the DFP is in the 
hands of experts and is done on a percentage basis. Experts must take into account not only 
the impairment of physiological (physical or psychological) functions but also permanent 
pain (douleurs permanents-douleurs fantômes), the loss of quality of life, and the troubles of 
everyday existence, personal, family and social that continue after the consolidation of 
the claim.195 While the impairment (incapacity) is still to be evaluated au point, as the IPP 
was under the earlier regime,196 with each point’s value being proportionate to the degree 
of incapacity and reversely proportionate to age197 the pain and suffering (souffrances), 
although generally taken into account together with the evaluation of the degree of 
incapacity, sometimes requires a separate evaluation of its ‘intimate aspect’ (aspet intime)198 
from its functional aspect (aspet fonctionnel). The DFP comprising both pain and suffering 
and loss of amenities, is calculated, therefore, overall on an objective “scientific” basis. Any 
special subjective circumstances of the victim that add to this objectively functional loss 
are, however, to be taken into account separately, under the head of ‘loss of enjoyment’ 
(préjudice d’agrément), a head of damage already developed in the case law with many 
conceptual fluctuations, but now expected to be used with greater clarity, and in the more 
specific sense of regarding only the compensation of the loss of a specific activity, sport or 
leisure,199 which the victim can prove they enjoyed regularly before the injury. In this sense 
193 Aesthetic loss is seen as much more serious, at its ‘maximum’, for an unmarried young woman and at its 
‘minimum’, for example, for an aged man whose job does not involve beauty looks: Le Roy, M, Le Roy J-D, and 
Bibal, F, (2013) L ‘Evaluation du Préjudice Corporel (The evaluation of personal injury) 19th ed. LexisNexis 129.
194 No deductions of so-called collateral benefits are allowed under English law from the part of the award 
intended to compensate the victim’s non-pecuniary harm (pain and suffering and loss of amenity).
195 Cour de Cassation. 2ème chambre civile (Second Civil Chamber) 28 mai 2009 n° 08-16829.
196 But now the use of each point of deficit is limited to quantifying the incapacity only and is not taken into 
account to quantify also economic-professional consequences as before (see the criticism of the system of calcul 
au point by Lambert-Faivre, Y, & Porchy-Simon, S (2008) Droit du dommage corporel, systemes d’indemnisation (Law 
of Personal Injury, systems of compensation) Paris Dalloz, 6th edition, 227-230)
197 Le Roy, M, Le Roy J-D, and Bibal, F, (2013) L ‘Evaluation du Préjudice Corporel (The evaluation of personal 
injury), 19th ed., Paris, LexisNexis no. 142, 133.
198 E.g. depression, grief for lost bodily functions, suffering caused by medical treatment.
199 According to the courts, this head of damage includes the victim’s inability to engage in “activités spécifiques, 
ludiques, culturelles, sportives, de loisir, ou associatives” (“specific, ludic, cultural, sportive, holiday or mating 
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the French nomenclature is clearer than the English and the nomenclature in several other 
jurisdictions where both the objective physiological impairment and the subjective loss of 
enjoyment of a specific activity are dealt with under the same head of ‘loss of amenity’. 
However, it should be noted that English and, also, German law, as well as other European 
jurisdictions, see as a separate ontological category the loss of the capacity to enjoy a sport, 
free time or a hobby, or even the chance to develop a hobby.200 Significantly, and inevitably, 
in French law201 this loss is compensated solely on the basis of the sovereign appreciation 
of the trial judge, i.e. normatively, not determined by expert “scientific” evaluation.
The list Dintilhac continues with the ‘permanent aesthetic loss’ (préjudice esthétique 
permanent), evaluated this time by experts on a scale of 1 to 7, a head of damage that aims 
to compensate the permanent aesthetic alteration suffered by the victim.202 As in the case 
of the temporary aesthetic damage, the particular circumstances and complaints of the 
victim must be taken into account.203 And again as in the case of the temporary aesthetic 
damage, permanent injury to physical appearance can be a constitutive element of other 
heads of permanent injury at the same time, such as prejudice professionnel (professional 
loss), prejudice sexuel (sexual loss), prejudice d’etablissement (loss of establishment),or 
prejudice d’agrement (supra). The next head of damage is the permanent204 “sexual loss’, 
prejudice sexuel. The Cour de Cassation205 accepts that there are three main categories of 
préjudice sexuel206: (a) préjudice sexuel  morphologique (morphological sexual injury), which is 
the injury to primary and secondary sexual organs, 207 (b) prejudice a la vie sexuele elle-meme 
(perte d’envie ou de plaisir) (injury to sexual life itself, loss of desire or pleasure), meaning 
the loss of the enjoyment of sex (loss of libido, loss of capacity to perform a sexual act, 
loss of capacity to achieve pleasure), and (c) prejudice lie a la procreation (Harm linked to 
procreation), the loss consisting of the impossibility or difficulty to procreate.208 In view of 
activities”), in which a person of the victim’s age can normally engage: see Cour de Cassation. 2ème chambre civile 
(Second Civil Chamber), 8 avril 2010, pourvoi (appeal) no. 09-11634. The Cour de Cassation appears to accept that 
the prejudice d’agrement exists separately from the PFT even before the stabilisation of the victim’s injuries : see 
Cour de Cassation. 2ème chambre civile (Second Civil Chamber) 3 juin 2010 pourvoi (appeal) no. 09-13246 and Cour 
de Cassation 2ème chambre civile (Second Civil Chamber) 4 novembre 2010 pourvoi (appeal) no. 09-69918 Gazette du 
Palais 13 juillet 2011. In the case of children who have not yet been able to develop a preference for any play 
or leisure activities, it is enough to prove that the injury deprived them of the opportunity of engaging in a 
particular activity normal to their age, without need to prove that they were actually doing so before they were 
injured, as is required in the case of adults.
200 See for German law BGH 20.01.2004-VI ZR 46/03 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift –RR 2004, 671: for children, 
German law adopts an approach similar to that of French law, above: see Oberlandsgericht (Court of Appeal) 
(OLG) Koeln, Versicherungsrecht (VersR) 1992, 975 
201 Likewise in other jurisdictions.
202 The manifestations of the préjudice esthétique permanent can be light (léger), medium (moyen), or important. 
203 ‘particularités de la victime et doléances’: see Le Roy, M, Le Roy J-D, and Bibal, F, (2013) L ‘Evaluation du 
Préjudice Corporel (The evaluation of personal injury) 19th ed. LexisNexis 144.
204 This is the sexual loss after the stabilization of the victim’s condition. There is in principle no separate head 
for temporary sexual loss, because before stabilization of the victim’s condition such a loss is included in the 
temporary functional deficit (DFT) suffered by the victim: See Cour de Cassation. 2ème chambre civile (Second Civil 
Chamber) 3 juin & 4 juin 2010 pourvoi (appeal) no. 09-13246 & 09-69918, with the matter debated in the doctrine, 
see the note on these two decisions of A. Renelier, ‘Vers une autonomie du prejudice d’agrement temporaire? 
(Towards an autonomy of the temporary loss of enjoyment?)’ in Gazette du Palais 13 & 16 juill 2011.
205 True to the Gallic tradition of being open about sex?
206 Cour de Cassation. 2ème chambre civile (Second Civil Chamber) 17 juin 2010 pourvoi (appeal) no. 09-15842, 
Bulletin civil 2010 II no. 115.
207 Including injury to such secondary erogenous zones such as mouth and breasts.
208 Sexual loss, too, may overlap with other heads of damage: inability to procreate, for example, can be also 
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its nature, inevitably, evaluation of this head of damage is left to the sovereign assessment 
of the judge.209 
It is, indeed, noteworthy that both the permanent aesthetic loss and the permanent 
sexual loss are singled out as separate heads of damage and not left to the general head 
of DFP,210 and that so are, too, the remaining three heads of damage on the list Dintilhac: 
the “establishment loss” (préjudice d’établissement), the exceptional permanent losses 
(préjudices permanents exceptionnels) and the potential future non-pecuniary losses not 
actually occurred at the time of consolidation (préjudices extrapatrimoniaux évolutifs). The 
establishment loss refers to the loss of the chance to pursue a project of family life resulting 
from the consequences of the injury that continue after consolidation, the impossibility 
to marry and begin a family or interference with existing family life,211 and it is a head of 
damage that must be compensated separately and not be confused with other neighbouring 
heads.212 The risk of overlap here with the prejudice sexuel or prejudice d’agrement is obvious, 
but, as already seen, this is a risk that exists also with other specific heads of loss, and 
generally a common risk in a nomenclature in which heads of non-pecuniary losses are 
singled out in considerable detail.213 Evaluation by the trial judge is normative (pouvoir 
souvereign du juge du fond-sovereign power of the trial judge), done in concreto taking into 
account the age and other actual circumstances of the victim. Interestingly, under the head 
of exceptional permanent losses are taken into account cultural variations, for example, 
the inability of a Japanese person to bow as a sign of courtesy, or the singularity of the 
circumstances of the accident, such as the particularly traumatic effect of a mass accident 
or an assassination attempt. Finally, under the head of potential non-pecuniary losses can 
be compensated possible future development of an illness such as HIV/Aids or Creutzfeldt 
Jacob disease, mesothelioma and generally the risk of development of a pathology that 
affects the prognosis at the time of stabilization of the injuries.214 In this connection, and 
seen as an infirmity compensated under the head of functional deficit. See Le Roy, M, Le Roy J-D, and Bibal, 
F, (2013) L ‘Evaluation du Préjudice Corporel (The evaluation of personal injury) 19th ed. LexisNexis n. 152, 147.
209 It is not surprising that this loss has been described as ‘protean’, both in its origin and in its manifestation: 
Le Roy, M, Le Roy J-D, and Bibal, F, ibid. (2013) 153, 148. Proof is necessarily complex, as it involves both 
objective and subjective elements such as, among others, age, personal situation, previous abstinence, intimacy, 
embarrassment, shame. In case of previous abstinence, compensation is not necessarily excluded, as abstinence 
is a form of exercise of sexual autonomy that has now been violated, and it acquires a completely different 
meaning when it becomes from voluntary enforced. This shows the importance of the functional aspect of this 
loss.
210 But they are both included in the DFT (temporary functional deficit) and do not constitute separated heads 
of damage before the stabilization of the victim’s injuries.
211 Thus the change of family conditions and structure, for example, the victim must now live with their 
parents, or cannot take care of children or old parents will be compensated under this head.
212 Cour de Cassation. 2ème chambre civile, (Second Civil Chamber)6 janv. 1993, pourvoi (appeal) no. 91-15391 
Bulletin civil 1993 II no. 6; 
213 The loss of social and family life is also compensated in German law (Stoerung des Familienlebens), as 
well as several other jurisdictions, but not as a separate head of damage: BGH Versicherungsrecht 1982, 1141; 
Oberlandsgericht Hamm Monatschrift fuer Deutsches Recht 1975, 490, 491; Muenchener Kommentar zum Buergerlichen 
Gesetzbuch 2007 Band 2 Para 241-432 5th ed. Para. 253 no 42 486; see also Slizyk , A(2013) Beck’sche Schmerzensgeld-
Tabelle (Beck’s Pain & Suffering Tables) 9th ed. Beck no 43 and following, for analysis of case law compensating 
the loss of family value time caused by the injury of the victim, and the particular moment it happened, such as 
during a family holiday or Christmas, or a family marriage, or School exams.
214 See e.g., Jurisclasseur Periodique (JCP) G 1995, I 3893, Chronique G. Viney ;Revue Trimestrielle de Doit Civil 
(RTDC) 1995 p. 626 observations P. Jourdain ; Cour de Cassation. 2ème chambre civile (Second Civil Chamber) 
2 avril 1996, Bulletin civil 1996 II no. 88; JCP G 1996, I 3985, Chr. G. Viney. Under this head are compensated 
all so-called ‘evolving non-pecuniary losses that escape the stabilisation of the victim’s condition’ (préjudices 
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exercising its sovereign power to fill the gaps of the intentionally incomplete list Dintilhac 
in pursuit of the principle of full compensation (réparation intégrale), the Cour de Cassation 
openly recognises since 2010215 an additional head of damages, the “anxiety loss’ (préjudice 
d’anxiété ou d’angoisse),216 repeatedly applied in cases of exposure to asbestos.217
 More judicial additions to the list Dintilhac include the loss of “shortened life” (préjudice 
de vie abrégée),218 only if the victim is conscious of their loss of a lengthier life, and the “loss 
of time to prepare” (préjudice d’impréparation), when the victim of inadequate information 
on a medical risk does not have proper time to prepare for the consequences of such risk 
materialising.219 But eventually the Cour de Cassation indicated that too much judicial 
creativity220 in developing the nomenclature could not be left unbridled and recently221 
reversed a Court of Appeal that wanted to compensate the non-pecuniary loss arising from 
the impossibility for the victim to unhurriedly seek medical care.222
Turning to German law, we find it different than both French and English law in 
its fundamental approach to nomenclature: there is, in fact, no official nomenclature 
of any detail. No normative categorisation into separate heads of damage of the 
‘Nichtvermoegenschaden’ (non-patrimonial loss), referred to in para. 253 BGB is attempted, 
either in the Civil Code or the case law. Instead, under the general scope of this term case 
law and commentators include a detailed ontology of non-pecuniary harm that compares, 
and sometimes exceeds, that addressed in the nomenclature of French law. The difference 
extrapatrimoniaux évolutifs, hors consolidation), incurable conditions that are subject to further evolution 
(maladies incurables susceptibles a évoluer) and all evolving pathologies (toutes pathologies évolutives) : see Le Roy, 
M, Le Roy J-D, and Bibal, F, (2013) L ‘Evaluation du Préjudice Corporel (The evaluation of personal injury) 19th ed. 
LexisNexis n. 152, 155, 156 and following 
215 Cour de Cassation. Chambre Sociale (Social Chamber) 11 mai 2010 pourvois joints (joint appeals) n° 09-42241 à 
n° 09-42257, Dalloz 2010. 2048, note C. Bernard ; 2011. 35, obs. O. Gout ; Revue Trimestrielle de Droit Civile 2010. 
564, obs. P. Jourdain ; Jurisclasseur Periodique 2010. 733, note J. Colonna et V. Renaux-Personnic ; Chronique, 
responsabilité civile, obs. P. Stoffel-Munck, et C. Bloch, n° 1015, n° 1. The assessment of this head of loss is done 
by the judge with reference to a reasonable person’s threshold of fortitude: see V. Wester-Ouisse, Les préjudices 
d’angoisse et autres contrarietes (2014) (The harm of anxiety and other contradictions), (unpublished paper, on 
file), 9.
216 This is also included in the German ontology of compensatable injury: OLG (Court of Appeal) Augsburg 
Recht 08, nr. 2822; BGHZ 114, 284, 298, NJW 1991, 1948. (fear of HIV infection).
217 Cour de Cassation. Chambre Sociale (Social Chamber), 4 déc. 2012, n° 11-26294, Responsabilite. civile et assurances 
2013, Etude 3, par C. Corgas-Bernard. Contrast the decision of the House of Lords in Rothwell (supra), where 
the anxiety of asbestos exposure victims who had already been physically affected by the exposure but had not 
developed any symptoms of an illness was not accepted as recognisable injury.
218 Cour de Cassation. Chambre Criminelle (Criminal Chamber), 23 oct. 2012, n° 11-83770. 
219 Cour de Cassation. 1ère Chambre Civile (First Civil Chamber), 12 juill. 2012, n° 11-17.510 ; see the English case 
of Chester v Afshar [2004] UKHL 41; [2005] 1 A.C. 134, where this lack of preparation was instrumental in the 
House of Lords holding that the doctor’s failure to inform on the risk violated the patient’s private autonomy. 
But the HL did not single out this as a separate head of non-pecuniary loss resulting from the injury caused by 
the materialisation of the risk; instead, in an overall rather convoluted judgement, it was considered one of the 
factors that contributed to the doctor’s failure to inform being seen as a legal cause of that injury.
220 It must be noted that the inviolability of the human body is specifically protected in France by new articles, 
16-1 (“Chacun a droit au respect de son corps… Le corps humain est inviolable”)(Everyone has the right of respect for 
their body ... the human body is inviolable”)) and following articles, inserted in the Code Civil in 1994, which 
give power to the courts to extend protection according to the principle of full compensation.
221 Cour de Cassation. 1ère Chambre Civile (First Civil Chamber), 28 juin 2012, n° 11-19265. 
222 This judicial activity in extending the list Dintilhac has prompted new draft legislation (proposition de loi n. 
419) aiming the improvement of the compensation of victims by allowing an introduction of a nomenclature 
for all pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses by a decree in Council (Council of State). This draft law had its first 
reading in the National Assembly in February 2010 and was sent for discussion to the Senate the same month. 
It is still under discussion at the time of writing. 
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remains that in German law several of the normative categories of the nomenclature 
Dentilhac are not recognisable separate heads of non-pecuniary loss but are detailed in 
judgments as ontological manifestations of such harm. Compensation for non-pecuniary 
loss is in a single award of Schmerzensgeld (money for pain). Significantly, the Schmerzensgeld 
tabellen (compensation tables for pain and suffering), which correspond to the tariffs or 
guidelines for assessment of non-pecuniary losses in other jurisdictions, contain a list of 
various injuries and injury-types, and other types of harm are thrown in as the judge strives 
to arrive at a reasonable and equitable compensation. The BGH has sometimes intervened 
to make clear that certain events should be seen as Nichtvermeoegenschaden, such as an 
unwanted birth, but only to make sure that they are seen as such and not as a separate 
head of damage. The lack of detailed nomenclature appears to allow greater freedom to 
German courts to accommodate an expanding ontology of medically or otherwise proved 
non-pecuniary harm,223 unlike in France, where the detailed nomenclature, despite having 
been intentionally left incomplete, seems to predetermine to a significant extent any 
such expansion. But what is it that pulls French, and to a lesser extent, English law, to a 
direction different than that of German law in seeking a more detailed nomenclature?224 
If clarity as to the type of deductible benefits paid by third parties is the main reason for 
the explosion of nomenclature in France, surely everyone else ought to feel this need also. 
Perhaps part of the answer lies in the historical origins of Schmerzensgeld as a customary 
rule of old Germanic customary law that prevailed over the Roman law opposition to 
the recovery of non-pecuniary losses resulting from a personal injury suffered by a free 
man.225 As alien to the Roman law tradition, Schmerzensgeld was left untouched by the 
Pandektenwissenschaft, (Science of the Digest) which in the 19th century laid the dogmatic 
foundations of contemporary German legal doctrine in the fertile soil of the Digest.
223 See the long list in Slizyk, A (2013), supra, note 213.
224 Interestingly, in Belgium, too, a jurisdiction very close to France, no official nomenclature has been 
adopted, although case law and doctrine use a typology of harm in assessing damages for non-pecuniary harm 
not so dissimilar to the French, with corresponding nomenclature sometimes in Latin: moral damage stricto 
sensu; physical pain (damnum/pretium doloris); psychological damage; aesthetic damage; sexual damage (pretium 
voluptatis); loss of pleasure and delight (prejudice d’agrement); extra damage as a result of the victim’s young 
age (pretium iuvenilis) Cousy, H and Droshout, D (2001), ‘Belgium, Non-Pecuniary Loss in Belgian law’, in W. 
V. Horton Rogers (ed.) Damages for Non-Pecuniary Loss in a Comparative Perspective, Tort and Insurance Law, vol. 2. 
Springer 30 following. 
225 The so-called Schmerzensgeld (‘money for pain’) has a long history in German law, and its origins are in old 
Germanic customary law: see, generally, Schmoeckel, M, Rueckert, J & Zimmermann, R (eds) (2007) Historisch-
kritishcer Kommentar zum BGB , Band II Schuldrecht: Allgemeiner Teil , (Historical-Critical Commentary on the 
BGB, Volume II, Law of Obligations, General Part) Mohr paras 241-432. In the 19th century and prior to the 
introduction of the BGB, the Reichsgericht, German Supreme Court before the second World War, had departed 
from the position of Roman law, then applicable within the ius commune of German states, that non-pecuniary 
loss from personal injury cannot be compensated because “the body of a freeman is not subject to evaluation”: 
Liberum corpus nulum recipit aestimationem (D 9,3, 7). The Reichsgericht would apply instead an alleged rule 
of Germanic customary law traced back to the Constitutio Criminalis Carolina (Peinliche Halsgerichtsordnung) 
(Carolinian Crimina Constitution, Sentencing judicial guidelines) of 1532, articles 20 and 21: see more in R. 
Bilstein (1994), Das deliktische Schadensersatzrecht der Lex Aquilia in der Rechtsprechung des Reichgerichts (The 
law of delictual compensation in the Lex Aquilia and the decisions of the Supreme Court), 88 following In 
Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichts in Zivilsachen (Judgments of the Supreme Court in Civil Matters) (RGZ) 8, 117 
of 17 November 1882, the Civil Senate of the court held that compensation for non-pecuniary loss had to be 
calculated on the basis of the individual circumstances of the case, including the extent, intensity and duration 
of pain suffered by the victim. In this case the victim had a fragment of the attacker’s knife lodged in his 
cheekbone undetected for 16 years causing severe health problems and frequent pain and illness.
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But the Italian nomenclature is more detailed. Consisting of the three heads of danno 
patrimoniale, danno biologico and danno morale discussed earlier, it has been enriched by a 
very recent decision of the Corte di Cassazione which broadened considerably, and rather 
dramatically, the ambit of danno morale, defining it, as ‘injury to the universal value of the 
human person, which is inviolable, and of which the legal protection must be full’.226 The 
Court further distinguished between danno morale proper, being the internal subjective 
suffering on a strictly emotional level, and danno dinamico-relazionale (dynamic-relational 
loss), or alternatively called ‘esistenziale’ (existential), consisting of the worsening of the 
conditions and habits, internal and external, of everyday life.227 This clear division of 
danno morale in two separate heads, suffering and loss of quality of life is a novelty for 
Italian law. Depending on the circumstances of each case, the intensity, duration and other 
characteristics of the loss, the capacity of the victim to cope with the trauma and all other 
harmful consequences of the injurer’s action, the victim has a right of full, non-equitable, 
compensation, by reference to nationally agreed tariffs (tabelle). The case itself was about 
the danno morale of close relatives, the widow and four children of a wrongfully killed 
person, meaning that the claimants had suffered no personal injury to health (danno alla 
salute/biologico) that might have justified such full compensation, but the language used 
by the Court is general and implies a principle not limited to cases of relatives’ grief 
for wrongful death. As such, it opens the possibility of general recovery of ‘pure’ non-
pecuniary loss, irrespective of physical injury, based on the fundamental and universal 
value of the human person, as the Court put it. It takes Italian law to a new ground, closer to 
French law where the inviolability of the human person is equally protected228, and ahead 
of other jurisdictions, where such loss is only recoverable under conditions in specific 
cases of wrongful death or nervous shock. It remains to be seen if this new definition of 
danno morale will be firmly established in the Italian nomenclature, the judgment of the 
Court having attracted immediate criticism by a leading writer in the field.229 
A separate concept and autonomous category of daño corporal has also been recently 
developed in Spanish scholarship, under the influence of developments in Italy, as 
‘impairment of health or bodily integrity of the human being which is certain and real and 
independent of the pecuniary and non-pecuniary results that it produces”.230 Additionally, 
the Spanish Supreme Court, in another development echoing Italian developments, 
recognises pretium doloris as a separate head of damage, additional to pecuniary ad 
226 Cassazione civile, Sezione III (Section III), 17 aprile 2013, n. 9231, Pres. Carleo, Rel. Chiarini. Pm. Corasaniti
227 The existence (!) of danno esistenziale as a separate head of non-pecuniary loss was denied by the Corte di 
Cassazione in Cassazione Sezioni Unite(United Sections), 11 November 2008, no 26972; but lower courts continued 
to award damages in small claims for such loss raised by, for example, football fans denied the chance of 
watching a football match on TV due to technical problems of the broadcasting company: Giudice di Pace (Justice 
of the Peace) Castellamare di Stabia 10 February 2007.
228 Article 16-1 following, Code Civil see supra
229 See Corte di Cassazione 20 novembre 2012, n.20292, in Danno e Responsabilità, with comment by G. Ponzanelli, 
‘Non è tanto il danno esistenziale, ma il quantum il vero problema del danno non patrimoniale’ (“The real problem of non-
patrimonial loss is not so much the existential loss but the quantum’); Corte di Cassazione 4 dicembre 2012,n.21725, 
in Danno e Responsabilità 2013, 294 with comment by Giulio Ponzanelli, ‘Disservizi dell’amministrazione giudiziaria 
e danno non patrimoniale’ (“Service failures of judicial administration and non-patrimonial loss).
230 De Angel Yaguez, R (1993) Tratado de responsabilidad civil (Treatise of Civil Liability) Civitas p. 698 ; Vicente 
Domingo, E (1994) Los danos corporales : typologia y valoracion (Corporal Injuries: Typology and evaluation) J. M. 
Bosch p. 323.
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non-pecuniary loss.231 It is primarily the causa doloris of relatives of a wrongfully killed 
person, but, like in Italy, it does not seem to be limited to cases of wrongful death. The 
Spanish Supreme Court has taken a lead in the Romanistic tradition in clarifying this basic 
nomenclature in a recent decision.232 The court applying a conceptual distinction between 
harmful event and harmful consequences (also known in Italian doctrine as the distinction 
between danno evento and danno conseguenza), held that “according to its origin, damage 
caused to property or to the rights of a person can be classified as property damage if 
it affects his pecuniary assets, biological damage if it refers to his physical integrity, or 
moral damage when it refers to his rights of personality”. The court went on to hold 
that in the case of all three harmful consequences both patrimonial and non-patrimonial 
losses are possible and equally recoverable.233 Interestingly in Portugal also a distinction is 
made between ‘dano corporal’, perceived as functional (biologico), a ’somatic and biological 
devaluation of the person’ including danos biologicos de natureza psiquica (biological harm 
of a psychological nature), considered as sui generis non-pecuniary harm or tertium genus 
(an amphibious creature), and dano de afirmacao pessoal-dano a vida de relacao (harm to 
affirmation of personal autonomy, including harm to a person’s social life, dano sexual 
(sexual harm), the so-called premium juventutis (youth premium), and other related non-
pecuniary harm.234
OVERVIEW OF THE EUROPEAN LANDSCAPE: AREAS OF UNCERTAINTY
The comparative study of non-pecuniary harm from personal injury reveals the importance 
of distinguishing the ontology of non-pecuniary harm from nomenclatures used by the 
courts. Ontology is in the hands of experts and lawyers, working together, sometimes in 
order to push further the limits of recovery. Nomenclatures are ways of managing the 
ontology of harm. The richness of ontology of harm in the experience of European courts 
reflects the most intimate aspects of social and personal values in each jurisdiction. But 
the European experience also shows the limits of nomenclatures. Zooming out on the 
European landscape we can see a number of areas of uncertainty that stand out.
First, important heads of injury and types of harm can overlap, even where the basic 
nomenclature is more general rather than detailed,235sometimes in unexpected ways. 
Several borderlines become fuzzy, because the nomenclature is not clear or adequate: 
such as pain and suffering and loss of future earning capacity, 236 pain and suffering and 
231 STS 29.12.1998, RJ 1998, no.9980, Rivero Hernandez, F in Lacruz Berdejo, JL (1995) Elementos de Derecho 
Civil, (Elements of Civil law), II, Dikynson 479.
232 STS 27.7.2006 RJ 2006 no. 6548
233 See Martin-Casals, M & Ribot J, in Winiger, B, Koziol, H, Koch, B and Zimmermann, R (eds) (2011), Digest 
of European Tort Law, vol. 2, Essential Cases on Damage De Gruyter 31, 32,
234 See details in von Bar supra note 49, at 368.
235 When the risk of overlap is greater as shown in the analysis of the French nomenclature Dintilhac, supra.
236 Thus the German Appeal Court in Jena, in its judgment of 24.11.1998, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift - 
Rechtsprechungsreport Zivilrecht (Case law report: Civil law) (NJW-RR) 2000, 103 granted ‘aggravated pain and 
suffering damages’ to a top amateur athlete whose chances for a professional future were destroyed by his 
injury. Such aggravated pain and suffering damages are intended to compensate for the grave change of the 
victim’s future life, and the loss of his self-realisation potential, which is seen as a serious personality loss. 
They are assessed regardless of actual distress caused by such a negative prospect on the basis of a judicial 
assessment of an ‘ideal impairment’, which brings it closer to loss of amenity. The purpose of compensating a 
potential future loss of earnings is rather thinly disguised in such cases.
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loss of amenity; pain and suffering and ‘mortal terror’; pain and suffering and fear of 
developing a disease; loss of faculty and loss of amenity; loss of pleasurable hobby or past-
time and loss of amenity. In applying or revising nomenclatures under developing social 
demands, courts everywhere are charged with the duty to apply relatively simple and not 
very detailed rules and they do not always follow a consistent line, ooscillating between 
different policies and goals. 
Second, another area of uncertainty exists regarding the relevance of cognitive loss, 
i.e. the relevance of the victim’s awareness of their predicament and ability to feel pain or 
humiliation. The distinction between pain and suffering and loss of amenity can be useful 
in that respect, for while the former can only be cognitive in nature, the latter can, but does 
not need to, be so. Those jurisdictions that do not in principle distinguish between pain 
and suffering and loss of amenity are facing an additional challenge with claims of non-
pecuniary harm when the victim is unconscious or in a permanent vegetative state, than 
those who do.237 Those who do so distinguish are faced with the choice of whether to allow 
in such cases recovery for both, or loss of amenity only, because the victim cannot feel 
pain, or neither. While the compensation of cognitive loss only would be consistent with a 
mainly compensatory function of damages, ignoring the cognitive element would appear 
to be essential if the function of damages is to vindicate the injury to the human dignity of 
the victim. The diminution of human dignity caused by the injury clearly does not depend 
on whether the victim feels pain or is aware of the loss of amenity. Indeed, in jurisdictions 
like the German, in which human dignity is the most fundamental of fundamental human 
rights, the loss of the capacity to feel pain or be aware of the loss of amenity can in itself be 
seen as loss of a basic faculty of a complete human being that needs to be compensated.238 
Similarly, under Austrian case law, an unconscious victim can recover damages for pain 
and suffering because “… a detrimental effect on the structure of a person’s personality which 
makes that person unable to feel pain and suffering in contrast to well-being and joy and which 
thus deprives that person from its elementary human perception triggers liability for damages 
comprising the non-material damage suffered. Those deprived of their fundamental perception 
suffer at least an equal disadvantage as a person whose sensation of well-being is disturbed by 
237 No distinction between pain and suffering and loss of amenity in the Spanish Road Traffic Liability Act of 
2004, which although applicable only to traffic accidents is applied more generally by the courts. As already 
noted such a distinction is made in other jurisdictions, either in the nomenclature, as in English law where they 
are separate heads of damage, and in French law, where they are diffused under more detailed specific heads 
of damage), or in the recognised ontology in the assessment of non-pecuniary loss damages, as in German 
law. More nebulous is the position of Italian law on this, where the danno biologico (biological harm) certainly 
includes the loss of amenity, although it is greater in scope than that, but it is not clear if it also includes pain 
and suffering, which may now be taken into account under the recently expanded notion of danno morale (moral 
damage), that seems to have absorbed the discredited danno esistentiale (Existential loss): see supra, Corte di 
Cassazione 20 novembre 2012, n.20292, in Danno e Responsabilità, with comment by G. Ponzanelli.
238 See the discussion of the compensation in German law of a person’s Wuerdenetschaedingung (injury to a 
person’s worth) supra. However, if the victim dies immediately after been injured no compensation for non-
pecuniary loss (Schmerzensgeld) is allowed, as death is no cause of action in German law. Close relatives in 
German law can only recover for the shock caused by the death of the victim, under the conditions of liability 
for shock injuries (Schockshaeden) (liability comparable to liability for Nervous shock in English law): Deutsch, 
E and Ahrens, H-J (2013) supra note 37 no. 483, 223. But close relatives-dependents of the deceased also have 
personal claims for wrongful death in English law (Fatal Accidents Acts), in Austria and Switzerland (supra), in 
France (dommage moral par ricochet-moral damage by reflection), Spain ( dano moral), Portugal and Italy (danno 
morale, see the recent Cassazione civile, Sezione III, 17 aprile 2013 n. 9231 supra)
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pain...”239. Leading authors in Austria argue, moreover, that assessment of damages in 
such cases should proceed in an objective-abstract way, without taking into account the 
subjective situation of the victim who does not have any sensation of pain. 240 Equally in 
France, the Cour de Cassation has held in a judgment in 1995 that a chronic vegetative state 
“does not exclude an award of damages under any of the heads of recoverable damage’‘ 
(l’état d’inconscience totale d’une victime n’exclut aucun chef d’indemnisation’) .241 As put by an 
eminent French scholar, ‘ le préjudice n’est pas ce qu’en perçoit la victime, mais ce qu’un tiers 
extérieur peut constater’ (the loss is not what the victim perceives but what a third external 
party can verify) .242
All these jurisdictions, however, would seem to accept that the unconscious state of 
the victim may affect the quantum of damages, which in some jurisdictions can be close 
to symbolic in case of complete unconsciousness. In Germany, the Bundesgerichtshof (BGH) 
had originally accepted that since one of the established aims of pain and suffering awards 
in personal injury cases under § 253 (2) BGB) is to provide satisfaction (“Genugtuung”) to 
the victim,243 if the victim is unconscious and unable to feel any satisfaction when receiving 
the money, only symbolic damages can be awarded. But recently the BGH broke away 
from this precedent, referring to constitutional principles protecting human dignity (Art. 
1 (1) of the German Constitution-Grundgesetz ), and now accepts that at least in those 
cases where the injury leads to a “destruction of personality”, a full and fair equitable 
compensation should be awarded.244 The Dutch Supreme Court (Hoge Raad) also seems to 
accept, in a somewhat ambivalent judgment, that the fact that the victim is left temporarily 
unconscious (initially, but no longer completely unconscious later) is as such not enough 
to withhold compensation for pain and suffering, but is relevant in determining the 
239 Oberster Gerchtshof (OGH) 23.4.1992, 6 Oberster Gerchtshof in `Zivilsachen (Ob) 535, 1558/9, Ehe- und 
familienrechtliche Entscheidungen (Austrian Supreme Court Marriage and Family law decisions) 69.111, reversing 
earlier case law. See also, OGH 31.8.1992, 8 Ob 581/92; OGH 14.1.1993, 2 Ob 66/92 Zeitschrift für Verkehrsrecht 
(ZVR) 1993/150; Recht der Medizin (RdM) 1995, 116; OGH 11.3.1999, 2 Ob 192/97t ZVR 2000/54: Death after 40 
years of comatose unconsciousness without any perception or sensation, damages of Austrian Shillings 60.000 
(=4360 €). This case law was hailed by the majority of the Austrian doctrine: Koziol, H (1997) Österreichisches 
Haftpflichtrecht (Austrian Civil Liability law) I, Manz, Wien, 3, 11/23; Karner, E (1999) Der Ersatz ideeller Schäden 
bei Körperverletzung (The Compensation of ideal damage in cases of personal injury), Springer, 123; Danzl, K-H, 
Gutierrez-Lobos, K and Müller, OF (2008) Das Schmerzengeld in medizinischer und juristischer Sicht (Compensation 
for pain from a meical and legal perspective) 9th ed. Manz 121; contra: Huber, C ‘Antithese zum Schmerzengeld 
ohne Schmerzen – Bemerkungen zur objektiv-abstrakten und subjektiv-konkreten Schadensberechnung 
(Antithesis of money for pain without pain-Comments on the objective-abstract and subjective-concrete 
evaluation of damage), ZVR 2000, 218; Harrer, F in Schwimann, M (2006) ABGB Praxiskommentar, (Commentary 
on the practice of the General Civil Code) LexisNexis § 1325 no 78. Other jurisdictions that allow recovery of 
damages for pain and suffering by an unconscious victim include France as already seen.
240 Karner, E supra, note 256 138; Karner, E and Koziol, H (2003) Der Ersatz ideellen Schadens im österreichischen 
Recht und seine Reform (The Compensation of ideal damage in Austrian law and its reform), Manz 60; Danzl, 
K-H, Gutierrez-Lobos, K and Müller, OF (2008) Schmerzengeld, supra note 256, 121; Kossak, W in Zeitschrift fuer 
Verkehrsrecht (ZVR) 2001, 229; see also Huber, C in ZVR 2000, 231; Oberlandsgericht (OLG) (Court of Appeal) 
Wien ZVR 2001, 43.
241 Cour de Cassation, 2e Chambre Civile (Second Civil Chamber) 22.02.1995, no. 92-18731 & no. 93-12644, Bulletin 
Civil II, 61 (two cases). This objective approach has now been established, after some hesitation in earlier cases, 
as it appeared be contrary to the principle of reparation integrale, fundamental principle of French law, which 
demands that the victim is not under- or over-compensated
242 Philippe Brun, National Report France, in Banakas, S et al. (eds), Personal Injury Compensation In Europe, The 
Common Core of European Private Law (unpublished, forthcoming).
243 BGH, 6.7.1955, BGHZ 18, 149.
244 BGH, 13.10.1992, BGHZ 120, 1.
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quantum.245 Even more ambivalent seems to be the answer of Italian law. Some Italian 
courts have refused in the past to compensate the pain and suffering of an unconscious 
victim, on the basis that danno morale only exists when the victim is consciously waiting for 
his death,246 thus disassociating pain and suffering, which was seen as danno morale, from 
danno biologico or danno alla salute, which is the injury to the physical or psychical integrity 
of the victim.247 Other Italian courts, however, emphasize the fact that even when the 
victim is not conscious of their injury, the injury exists, and its existence does not depend 
on its awareness by the victim.248 This view appears not to distinguish between pain and 
suffering and the actual injury to the victim’s physical and psychical integrity, including 
both in the concept of danno biologico, and now seems to prevail in Italian case law. By 
contrast, in English law damages for pain and suffering are not available to an unconscious 
victim. Pain and suffering has been said to be ‘an inherently subjective head of damage 
in the sense that it depends upon the existence of awareness in the victim of his plight’.249
Taking into account the consciousness or otherwise of the victim strengthens the 
compensatory character of the award but is contrary to the increasing demand for a 
normative protection of human dignity and personal integrity as a supreme good. We 
are a long way from Binding’s provocative observation that compensation should be 
available for things that can be compensated, and for the rest we should be content with 
criminal law. The punitive character of any damages for non-pecuniary harm when the 
victim is in a permanent vegetative state is difficult to deny, and that applies also to 
damages for loss of amenities awarded in such cases.250 But is that necessarily a bad thing? 
Criminal law is not at the victim’s disposal, and not always on the victim’s side, in the way 
that Tort law is. This is evidenced by cases where Tort law was able to deliver liability 
judgments when criminal law could only deliver non-guilty verdicts. All of that said, there 
is, furthermore, a common tendency across jurisdictions, with a few notable exceptions, 
not to compensate the loss of expectation of life (damages for reduced life expectancy),251 
245 See HR (Hoge Raad), 20 September 2002, Nederlandse Jurisprudentie (NJ) 2004 112 note JBMV (Cornelisse/
Lokhorst), and Lindenbergh/Verburg (2003), p. 372.
246 Corte di Cassazione, 2 aprile 2001 n. 4783 in Danno e responsabilita., 2001, 820, note by M. Bona; Tribunale 
di Roma (Roma Tribunal) 7 marzo 2002 in Archivio giuridico della circolazione e dei sinistri stradali 2002, 574; in 
Giurisprudenza di Merito 2002, 981.
247 On these concepts see supra.
248 Corte di Cassazione, 1 dicembre 2003, n. 18305, in Danno e Responsailita, 2004, 143, note by M. Bona. Of the same 
opinion is the judgment of the Corte di Cassazione,19 ottobre 2007, n. 21976, in Danno e responsabilita, 2008, 313 , 
with note by Foffa; Responsabilita civile e providenza, 1995, 309, with note by Pellecchia; in Giurisprudenza italiana, 
1995, I, 1, c. 1534 , with note by Citarella; in Foro italiano, 1995, I, c. 1852, with note by R. Caso; Corte di Cassazione, 
6 ottobre 1994, n. 8177, in Foro italano, 1995, I, 1852, and Corte di Cassazione,. 24 maggio 2001, n. 7075, in Giustizia 
civile Massimario, 2001, 1044.
249 West v Shephard [1964] AC 326, at 349, per Lord Morris. Interestingly, in the Republic of Ireland, a jurisdiction 
where the English common law continues to have a considerable influence, a distinction is drawn on the basis 
of the degree or nature of the victim’s unawareness. In Cooke v Walsh [1984] I.L.R.M. 208 medical evidence was 
submitted that the plaintiff, who was aged 11 at the time of the action, would never develop beyond the mental 
age of two and would have little or no awareness of his plight. The majority of the Irish Supreme Court held that 
as a result general damages (for pain and suffering and loss of expectation of life) would be moderate. However, 
in the case of Hughes v O’Flaherty (unrep). HC, 19 January 1996, the court refused to reduce an award for general 
damages on the basis of a plaintiff’s lack of awareness. In that case the plaintiff had limited awareness of his 
plight. This suggests that any reduction will only take place in the most severe cases. 
250 European jurisdictions that clearly allow recovery of loss of amenities also when the victim is unconscious 
include England, Germany, Austria, France, Italy and the Netherlands: see references in previous notes.
251 No damages for reduced life expectancy (lost years) in English law, after the introduction of the 
Administration of Justice Act 1982, section 1(1) b, but in assessing damages for pain and suffering the court should 
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or, indeed, the loss of life itself, i. e. damages for death.252 This shows a preference for 
a compensatory function in this respect of the non-pecuniary damages award, which in 
some jurisdictions is difficult to reconcile with an increasing tendency to compensate the 
unconscious victim, even in a permanent vegetative state (PVS), or loss of amenities or the 
violation of physical integrity.253 Is the loss of life expectancy, and, a fortiori, the loss of life 
itself, not the overwhelming manifestation of an overarching amenity loss that embraces 
all other amenity losses, i. e. the loss of the pleasure of being alive itself?254 Or is death to 
take into account any suffering caused or likely to be caused by awareness by the (conscious) claimant that 
his expectation of life has been reduced, and the ‘lost years’ are not taken into account in calculating future 
loss of earnings. Similarly in Germany: see the discussion of German case law in Slizyk, A (2013) Beck’sche 
Schmerzensgeld-Tabelle 9th edition Beck no 225, 100 following, and Austria. But damages for reduced life 
expectancy can be awarded in France: see Cour de Cassation, 2e Chambre Civile (Second Civil Chamber) 2 avril 
1996, no 94-16576, a contrario), and in Italy, where the loss of life expectancy can be seen as a direct consequence 
of the danno biologico suffered by the victim.
252 What is meant here is the victim’s own claim against the tortfeasor for depriving the victim wrongfully 
of their life, not any claims of third parties for their own personal dependency loss arising from the victim’s 
wrongful death, on which see below.
253 A special, but different, issue is a claim for the anxiety and horror experienced by a conscious victim faced 
with imminent death. Since the victim is dead, the existence of such a claim is only meaningful if the victim’s 
non-pecuniary loss claims, which have arisen before the victim’s death, can be inherited as part of the victim’s 
estate (below). Certain US jurisdictions have recognised a victim’s claim for pain and suffering in cases where 
the time between their injury and their death is either extremely short, or almost zero: See, eg, Landreth v Reed 
570 SW 2d 486 (1978): a child drowned, conscious pain was inferred and damages of $30,000 were awarded. 
In England the House of Lords has held in Hicks v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police [1992] 1 AC 310, that 
where the period of time between the injury and the death is short, damages for pain and suffering should not 
be awarded, and claims by the estates of three spectators crushed to death at a football stadium were denied 
on the basis that the period of time between the injury and death was too short. As a judge said in Hicks, ‘The 
last few moments of mental agony and pain are in reality part of the death itself for which no action lies’: 
Parker LJ in the Court of Appeal, [1992] 1 All ER 690. However, the Judicial College Guidelines for the Assessment 
of General Damages - new 11th Edition 2012, include such a ‘short death fear’ award. Interestingly, the matter 
has been discussed at some length in Austria where an authoritative view is that so-called ‘fear until death’ 
should be compensated if the tortfeasor’s fault is serious (under paras. 1323, 1324 ABGB, Austrian Civil Code), 
the victim did in fact experience fear and that in some way such fear can be ‘objectified’ (e.g. imminent crash 
of an airplane, but not unsuspected sudden terrorist attack): Karner E and Koziol H(2003) Der Ersatz ideellen 
Schadens im österreichischen Recht und seine Reform (The Compensation of ideal damage and its Reform), Manz, 
66; Koziol, H (2002), ‘Die Bedeutung des Zeitfaktors bei der Bemessung ideeller Schäden’(The significance of the 
time factor in the evaluation of ideal losses), in Festschrift Hausheer, Manz, 597 (603); comp. also Danzl, C-H (2002) 
‘Schmerzengeld im Wandel: Neues zu den Voraussetzungen und zur Höhe des Schmerzengeldanspruches’ 
Money for pain is changing: Recent developments regarding the conditions and measure of the claim for 
compensation of pain and suffering, Sachverständige (SV) 2002, 73 (80f), in connection with the fear of death of 
the Kaprun funicular fire victims. Pain and suffering claims before death in German law have as a precondition 
that there is a severe bodily injury that leads to death. Even a short interval however, of 30 or 60 minutes 
between injury and death, suffices for the courts to grant a pain and suffering award (see Oberlandsgericht (OLG) 
Hamm (Hamm Court of Appeal), 22.2.2001, Neue Zeitschrift für Verkehrsrecht (NZV) 2002, 234, 30 minutes: EUR 
2,500.00, OLG Hamm, 21.1.1997, NZV 1997, 233 1 hour: EUR 2,500.00), but plain mortal terror does not suffice. 
Under Italian law there is probably no danno biologico as death occurs almost immediately, but perhaps danno 
morale. The Corte di Cassazione has held in the past that at least 20/30 days before the death of the victim are 
needed for recoverable damage to exist (Cass. 30 June 1998, n. 6404, in Danno e responsabilita, 1999, 323, note 
Martorana; Cass. 26 September 1997, n. 9470, in Giurisprudenza italiana, 1998, 1589, note Bona; Cass. 23 February 
2005, n. 3766, in Foro italiano, 2006, I, 2463), but other decisions have accepted that a few hours of suffering can be 
a compensable danno morale notwithstanding the very short agony of the victim (Cass. 31 May 2005 n. 11601, in 
Riv. it. medicina legale 2006, 3, 694; Cass. 6 August 2007, n. 17177, in Archivio giuridico della circolazione e dei sinistri 
stradali, 2008, 35; Cass. civ. sezione lavoro (Cassation Court Labour law section), 7 June 2010, n. 13672, Danno e 
responsabilita 2011, 1, 29, note Foffa.).
254 In cases of very severe injury to the victim the subjective pleasure of being alive may be doubted, but this is 
normally no ground on which the tortfeasor is allowed to claim any relief for the injury to the victim’s physical 
integrity.
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be seen as better than a life deprived of all amenities? Yet, most jurisdictions draw the 
line with death, which is not accepted as a cause of action belonging to the deceased. In 
common law the reason given for this has been not a philosophical but a pragmatic one, 
i.e. that dead people cannot sue.255 But, of course, if wrongfully killed persons would have 
a claim arising from their own wrongful death, such a claim could be inherited as an asset 
of their estate, and for the benefit of the estate and their heirs, who, being, presumably, 
alive, would be perfectly able to sue. Other non-pecuniary loss claims belonging to the 
deceased and arising from the personal injury that finally caused their death are, in fact, 
inheritable in a number of jurisdictions, but at the same breath some of these jurisdictions 
deny the existence, and inheritability, of a victim’s claim for the loss of their own life. It 
seems odd that in legal orders where sanctity of life is a supreme legal principle decisive 
in many important areas of legal policy, no personal claim is recognised for wrongful 
deprivation of life, and, as recently proclaimed in the so-called (academic) Draft Common 
Frame of Reference of European Private law which purports to offer model rules for a 
common position of European jurisdictions on the matter, the loss of life should not be ‘a 
legally relevant’ damage’ for the law of Tort.256 Indeed, this does seem to be the position of 
most European jurisdictions.257 The Italian Corte di Cassazione, for example, while holding 
that the loss of life itself is not danno biologico,258 held that a person’s life is an interest 
distinct from a person’s health, certainly worthy of protection but only in criminal law.259 
Binding would have been pleased that finally, even if right at the end, a line is drawn in 
compensating the ‘uncompensatable’, but we cannot be so sure about Jehring. As a result, 
a tortfeasor who wrongfully kills outright a person without dependents accrues in most 
jurisdictions no liability to pay damages whatsoever, except, perhaps, funeral expenses,260 
or bereavement or third party shock losses, if third parties can establish grounds for such a 
limited personal claim. It is certainly cheaper to kill rather than wound. This puts the whole 
system of compensation in European jurisdictions for non-pecuniary loss into perspective. 
255 See Baker v Bolton (1808) 1 Camp 493, 170 ER 1033
256 Death ‘does not constitute legally relevant damage’ for the law of Tort, so far as the deceased is concerned: 
von Bar supra note 49, 394. 
257 In German law, life is included in the interests protected by Tort law from unlawful invasions under para. 
823 I BGB, but is not included in the list of injuries for which under the new para. 253 II BGB the victim may 
be awarded compensation for non-patrimonial loss. These are injury to the body, health, freedom and sexual 
self-determination (see supra). It appears that the justification for this is that the right to life ceases to exist 
with death, and, therefore, a compensation of its violation posthumously is not possible: see von Bar supra 
note 49. See also E. Deutsch, E and Ahrens, H-J, (2013) Deliktsrecht, supra note 37, no. 483, 223. The Austrian 
Supreme Court has made it clear that the compensation claims available to the deceased’s close dependents 
under para. 1327 ABGB for loss of maintenance are personal and original claims of these third parties and not 
the deceased’s: Oberster Gerichtshof 17.10.1963, Entscheidungen des oesterreichischen Obersten Gerichtshofs in Zivil- 
und Justizverwaltungssachen (Decisions of the Austrian Supreme Court in Civil Matters) (SZ) 36/133. Likewise in 
English law, while the rule that death is no cause of action remains (Baker v Bolton, supra), the maintenance and 
other claims of dependents under the Fatal Accidents Acts (see below) are personal third claims arriving from 
the victim’s wrongful death, notwithstanding the fact that they can be affected by the deceased’s contributory 
fault. Under Dutch and Spanish law too, death is no cause of action, although Spanish authors are disagreeing 
with the consistent case law to that effect: see the references in von Bar, above note 53 at 395. Exceptionally, 
Portuguese courts recognise the loss of life as a recoverable loss, the claim being the deceased’s original claim 
inheritable and to be exercised by the deceased’s heirs: see details and references in v. Bar., supra note 49, p. 395.
258 Corte di Cassazione 23 maggio 2003, no.8204, Giustizia civile Massimario 2003, fasc. 5.
259 Corte di Cassazione, sezione penale, 30.01. 2003, no.7632, Rivista Italiana di Medicina Legale (e del Diritto in 
campo sanitario), 2003, 694; Cass. 16 maggio 2003, no. 7632, Foro italiano 2003 I 2681.
260 As noted by Harrer, F, in Schwiman, M, ABGB Kommentar supra note 239, Para. 1327 no. 1
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A third area of uncertainty concerns the extent to which the impact of the victim’s 
injuries on third parties must be taken into account, particularly when they cause to a 
third party a personal non-pecuniary loss, such as grief or psychological illness. Such non-
pecuniary losses par ricochet or by reflection in certain jurisdictions are only recognised as 
independent personal losses of psychiatric nature by third parties under certain, limited, 
circumstances,261 whereas in other jurisdictions are considered as third party claims linked 
to the direct victim’s claim for personal injury.262 This is an important difference in the 
treatment of legal claims of the par ricochet victims, and not only in the strict legal sense 
of the consequences of any defects of the direct victim’s claim on the third party claim,263 
or insurability of liability or loss.264 The latter approach also shows a higher value been 
placed on relations and family solidarity and affection, while the former is defiantly 
individualistic, and, sometimes, appears to be unfairly restrictive.265
Related to the issue of par ricochet losses, but clearly different in legal nature, is the 
question of the survival, or inheritability of a non-pecuniary harm claim after the victim’s 
death.266 In the light of what was said above about the impossibility of a claim for death, 
it must follow that in those jurisdictions where this is the case the issue of inheritability 
of the victim’s claims can only arise if the victim is not killed instantly.267 Unlike in the 
261 Liability for Nervous shock in England; liability for Schockschaeden (shock injuries) in Germany
262 France, Austria, Switzerland
263 For example, the relevance of the contributory fault of the direct victim.
264 Cutting off par ricochet claims from personal injury would appear to make the liability risk more manageable 
for liability insurers, but quaere? 
265 Thus in English law close relatives who are so-called secondary victims of nervous shock can only recover if 
they witnessed the injury of the direct victim or its immediate aftermath, a restriction apparently dictated by the 
need to keep the floodgates of claims closed: see Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police [1992] 1 AC 310
266 Although the maxim actio personalis moritur cum persona (personal claims die with the person), seems to be 
universally recognised, the majority of European jurisdictions allow, sometimes under certain conditions, the 
survival of the victim’s actions for the benefit of their heirs. The English Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) 
Act 1934, Section 1(1) provides that ‘all causes of action subsisting against or vested in [the deceased] at the 
time of his death shall survive against, or as the case may be, for the benefit of, his estate’. In order to avoid the 
defendant being liable twice over, the Act provides that while the estate can recover damages for any pecuniary 
and non-pecuniary loss suffered between the time of the accident and the time of death, no damages are 
recoverable either for prospective pecuniary or non-pecuniary loss. Under German law, apart from dependents’ 
claims for financial support and funeral costs, exclusively regulated by National Accident Insurance law, no 
further claims in wrongful death cases are allowed, neither a pretium mortis nor bereavement damages or a 
pain and suffering, but the deceased victim’s valid claim of Schmerzensgeld can be inherited, after the abolition 
of the old para. 847 BGB in 2002 and the introduction of the new para. 253 II. Inheritable are non-pecuniary 
loss claims in France, after two major judgments of the mixed chamber of the Cour de Cassation, chambre mixte 
(mixed chamber) 30 avril 1976, Bulletin civil chambre mixte 1976, p. 1 no. 2 and Cass., chambre mixte 30 avril 1976, 
Bulletin civil chambre mixte 1976, p. 2 no. 3. , and also Belgium, Portugal (under the succession rules of art. 496 of 
the Portuguese Civil Code), Sweden, Ireland (Civil Liability Act 1961, s. 7(1)) and Austria (see OGH 11.07.2002, 
ZVR-Zeitschrift fuer Verhersrecht-2004, 26), also Koziol, H & Welser, R (2006) Buergerliches Recht (Civil law), II, 
2nd edition Manz 323), but not Greece. In Spain a recent judgment of the Supreme Court has gone against the 
tide in previous case law and doctrine, recognising the inheritability of non-pecuniary loss claims, even if the 
victim had not started proceedings while alive, as previously required (and as still required under Dutch law, 
art. 6:107 of the Dutch Civil Code): Sentencias del Tribunal Supremo (STS) 19.06.2003, RAJ (Repertorio Aranzadi di 
Jurisprudencia) 2003 (3) no 4244 p. 7941.
267 Thus in Italy the courts accept the inheritability of non-pecuniary loss claims, including the claim for danno 
biologico (biological harm), provided the deceased survived the injury even if only for the very minimum of time, 
which is not to be defined a priori by the courts: see Corte di Cassazione 7 March 2003, n. 3414, in Giustizia civile 
Massimario, 2003, 485; Cass. sezione penale (Criminal section), 30.01. 2003, no.7632, Rivista Italiana di Medicina 
Legale (e del Diritto in campo sanitario), 2003, 694; Cass. 16 May 2003, no. 7632, Foro italiano 2003 I 2681; Cass., 14 
July 2003, no. 11003, Responsabilita civile e providenza 2003, 1049.
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case of pecuniary harm resulting from a personal injury, it cannot be argued that there is 
a valid compensatory reason for the heirs of the victim to inherit the non-pecuniary harm 
claim of the (previously injured and now) deceased victim. Again the fundamental issue 
is whether the non-pecuniary harm suffered by the deceased when they were injured is 
wholly or partly strictly personal and subjective, or if at least part of it is to be compensated 
objectively as a diminution of human dignity. Inheritability of the non-pecuniary loss 
claim of the victim would be consistent with the latter approach. The heirs’ own personal 
non-pecuniary harm caused by the injury and, now, death, of the victim, is, of course, 
quite a separate matter, addressed by all jurisdictions, although, as we have just seen, only 
some among them recognise claims for third party non-pecuniary harm when the victim 
has not been killed.268 Inheriting a non-pecuniary harm claim can also be seen as a punitive 
measure, and, especially in cases of very serious accidental injury for which tortfeasors 
are obliged or generally expected to be insured, an exercise in wealth distribution.269 
Nevertheless, it is consistent with the logic of allowing the vindication of the worth of 
human life and dignity in cases in which the remaining lifetime of the victim is too short to 
allow them to do so themselves, by the victim’s heirs on their behalf. 
SOME FINAL THOUGHTS
At the most fundamental level, the debate on whether non-pecuniary harm from personal 
injury should be compensated or not has been won by the side which answers yes, 
although objections in principle keep flaring up the discussion from time to time.270 This 
debate has moved on from the classical Roman view, the logic of which was irresistible in 
a society in which humans were divided into freemen and slaves. Personal injury is now 
seen as perhaps the most serious manifestation of a violation of the integrity of the human 
person and of human dignity. Non-pecuniary harm is the most intimate in nature harm 
that results from such injury, also closely linked with the victim’s capacity to earn and 
enjoy material possessions. It is the increase of one’s fair share of pain, and the decrease 
of one’s fair share of pleasure, and as such should be as abhorrent to a utilitarianist271 as it 
should be to a Natural lawyer.272 The right to be compensated for personal injury (and the 
268 Quite reasonably courts in these jurisdictions refuse to distinguish between the personal effect on close 
relatives of a very grave injury and that of death. But third party losses have been in several jurisdictions 
seen as a step too far, and claims of close relatives are only allowed in cases of wrongful death, a limited 
and controlled exception, or if the result of personal nervous shock of the third party which is pathologically 
manifested (English and German law). 
269 Use of Tort law to achieve such a goal is seriously disputed: see Weisbach, DA (2003), ‘Should Legal Rules 
be Used to Redistribute Income?’ (70) University of Chicago Law Review 439 
270 These, including arguments put forward by the economic analysis school of thought, are critically assessed 
by Rogers, WVH (2001), ‘Comparative Report’, in Rogers, WVH (ed.) (2001) Damages for Non-pecuniary loss 
in a Comparative Perspective, Springer 247 and following, who concludes in favor of compensating fully non-
pecuniary losses. For the economic analysis perspective in more detail see Faure, M (2000) “Compensation 
of non-pecuniary loss: an economic perspective”, in Magnus, U and Spier, J. (eds) European Tort Law, Liber 
Amicorum for Helmut Koziol , Lang, Frankfurt am Main, 143.
271 ‘Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure.’ Bentham, 
J (1789), An Introduction to the Principles and Morals of Legislation, ch. 1, ‘Of the Principle of Utility’, Oxford, 
Clarendon Press.
272 As classically stated by Ulpianus in D. 1.1.10pr ‘Iustitia est constans et perpetua voluntas ius suum cuique 
tribuendi. Iuris praecepta sunt haec: honeste vivere, alterum non laedere, suum cuique tribuere’. (Justice is the constant 
and perpetual will to give to everyone what they deserve. The precepts of law are the following: live honestly, 
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right to compensate273) has been accepted without much controversy274 in contemporary 
societies as the civilised way to restore injustice to individual persons,275 and it is even seen 
in some jurisdictions as a fundamental right protected by the Constitution and beyond the 
reach of politicians and the common legislator.276 Money is not only the purest, but also 
the most civilised form of human interaction, as first detected by Mommsen and Jehring, 
and Tort law an unexpected healer of pain and of humiliation in contemporary societies.277 
Damages for non-pecuniary harm, far from commodifying and degrading personal 
integrity and dignity,278 can be seen as an affirmation of the importance of these values in a 
society in which talion279 ceased to be an option a long time ago. It is futile and makes little 
sense to justify the compensation in money of such harm in any other way.
The variety of architectures and the different approaches to nomenclature in Europe 
do not always lead to different results.280 Despite their intimate character, the most serious 
types of such harms are in principle recognised as recoverable almost everywhere. At 
the more conservative end, represented by Germanic and common law jurisdictions, the 
presence of a medically verifiable pathological or psychological condition resulting from 
a physical lesion of the body is still considered as an important condition of recovery, 
but even here there are examples of judicial ontological creativity in order to extend the 
do not harm another, give to everyone what they deserve).
273 Jehring’s idea, supra. Closure through compensation should be achieved for both parties, and a wrongdoer 
ought to be given the right of closure by fully compensating the victim.
274 Relevant, but impossible to discuss in this paper, is the Tort reform debate in the US and the debate in the 
UK on the so-called ‘compensation culture’. See for masterly summaries of opposing arguments in the US, 
Rabin, RL (1992), ’The Politics of Law Reform’ (26) Valparaiso University Law Review 709-716 and Phillips, JJ 
(1992), ‘Attacks on the Legal System-Fallacy of ‘Tort Reform’ arguments’ Trial 106-109; for the ‘compensation 
culture’ debate in England see Morris, A (2007) ‘Spiralling or Stabilising? The Compensation Culture and Our 
Propensity to Claim Damages for Personal Injury’ (70) Modern Law Review 349.
275 For restorative justice as a primary function of Tort law see Weinrib, EJ (1992) ‘Thinking About Tort 
Law’ (26) Valparaiso University Law Review, 717-722; Banakas, S (2002) ‘European Tort Law: Is it Possible?’, (9) 
European Review of Private Law 363-375; contributions to the Tort Symposium (2005) (5) Journal of High Technology 
Law 1. Restorative justice is also of increasing importance in Criminal law: see in the UK <http://www.rjc.org.
uk/> (Retrieved 6.10.2015). 
276 In the US the Missouri Supreme Court has recently found that the State statute that limits noneconomic 
damages in medical malpractice cases to $350,000 unlawfully infringes on a jury’s constitutional right to 
determine the amount of damage that a person has sustained from medical negligence, and declared the 
statute unconstitutional and void: 376 S.W.3d 633 (Mo. 2012). Supreme courts in Alabama, Georgia, Illinois, 
New Hampshire, Oregon, Texas and Washington have also declared their state damages caps unconstitutional, 
although such caps remain in place in 33 other states. In France the Constitutional Court (Conseil Constitutionnel) 
has recognized a victim’s constitutional right to obtain compensation for injury caused by the fault of another, 
under the principle of art. 1382 Code Civil: Conseil Constitutionnel, decision of 23 October 1982 p. 3210, available at 
<http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/francais/les-decisions/acces-par-date/decisions-
depuis-1959/1982/82-144-dc/decision-n-82-144-dc-du-22-octobre-1982.8004.html >(Retrieved 6.10.2015). 
However, Dean Carbonnier sharply observed with his inimitable wit at the time of this judgment, that ‘le droit 
à dommages et intérêts est un droit fondamental tandis que l’obligation de réparer, non’ (“the right of compensation 
is a fundamental right, whereas the obligation to compensate is not”), because the judgment does not seem to 
affect the status of any ordinary legislation on exclusion of liability. But even if there is no constitutional duty to 
compensate, should there not be a right to do so (see Jehring’s thought supra)?
277 See the brilliant eulogy and examples of the ‘healing’ function of Tort law in personal injury cases given by 
an eminent Canadian judge, Linden, AM (2005) ‘Viva Torts!’ (5) Journal of High Technology Law 139 
278 As forcefully argued by Abel, RL (1989-1990) ‘A Critique of Torts’ (37) University of California at Los Angeles 
Law Review 785 
279 The Old Testament rule of personal revenge, still applied in Islamic shari’a law today, allows victims to ask 
compensation from the wrongdoer, instead of his public punishment.
280 Justifying the presumptio similitudinis (presumption of similarity), the hope and sometimes self-fulfilling 
prophecy of comparative law adventures.
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right to compensation, wrongful birth being one of them,281 and the failure to prevent 
the development of an illness or disability, such as dyslexia, another.282 Recovery for the 
fear of contracting or developing an illness is still a dividing issue, with the Romanistic 
jurisdictions clearly open to it and common law jurisdictions still denying it. And it is 
again common law and German law that denies recovery of third party non-pecuniary 
harm,283 with some jurisdictions close to Germanic legal tradition splitting ranks on the 
issue, whereas Romanistic jurisdictions deal with such harm in the context of a more 
relaxed overall approach to third party losses.
Having said that, the difference in architecture and nomenclature is not without interest. 
It shows that the interest of a comparative study may be mainly in properly understanding, 
and appreciating, such differences. To take one example, it is interesting why English and 
German lawyers never thought of linking the non-pecuniary harm of so-called ‘secondary’ 
victims of nervous shock to the personal injury claim of the immediate victim and deal with 
such harm as third party non-pecuniary harm, like French lawyers did, but created instead 
a separate basis of liability to accommodate it.284 Arguably, the French is a more rational, 
and also more efficient in terms of transaction costs, way of dealing with such claims. It 
is also interesting that architectures of liability regimes inspired by ideology resulted in 
unique judicial creations in Swiss and Italian law, Swiss law developing a distinct basis of 
Tort liability, shadowing liability for pecuniary harm in cases of infringement of important 
personal rights, the ‘moral tort’ (‘tort moral’) to accommodate all non-pecuniary harm, and 
Italian law reifying non-pecuniary harm in the concept of ‘biological harm’ or ‘injury to 
health’ that can be subject to objective metrics and no longer needs to be seen as ‘moral’ 
harm.285
Detailed normative nomenclatures are rare, and the detail in the Dentilhac 
nomenclature introduced into French law is unparalleled in other legal systems. In the 
rest of the Romanistic jurisdictions, Italy, Spain and Portugal a more modest and less 
detailed nomenclature is used. The analysis and comparison of these nomenclatures in this 
paper shows that more detailed approaches have the advantage of greater certainly and a 
greater claim to fairness and equality (equality being a special concern in the French legal 
tradition). A detailed nomenclature like the nomenclature Dintilhac also allows a more 
careful analysis regarding certain harm types that are dealt with in other jurisdictions 
somewhat in a hurry. A good example is the distinction between the loss of amenity, 
classified as functional deficit in the nomenclature Dintilhac and assessed objectively on 
an incapacity scale, and the loss of the enjoyment of the related faculty by the victim, 
which is classified as prejudice d’agrement and assessed subjectively. This is analytically 
a better way of addressing the need of combining objective and subjective criteria in the 
evaluation of the loss of amenity,286 serving at the same the important need of more clarity 
in the judicial evaluation of non-pecuniary harm. It is also analytically sounder to look at 
281 Rees v Darlington Memorial Hospital NHS Trust [2003] UKHL 52; [2004] 1 AC 309
282 Phelps v Hillingdon B. C. [2001] 2 AC 619 (HL)
283 Unless it falls under the special category of nervous shock or Schockschaeden (Shock injuries)
284 Any policy reasons for limiting recovery of such harm can be taken into account in the assessment of non-
pecuniary harm damages.
285 Interestingly, some neighbouring jurisdictions in the same tradition such as France did not follow suit, but 
some, like Spain, did, as a result of scholarly interest in the Italian construction.
286 Compare the approach of English law in West v Shepherd [1964] AC 326
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non-pecuniary harm in two stages, the stage before, and the stage after, the stabilisation 
of the victim’s condition, as only the nomenclature Dintilhac does. Temporary non-
pecuniary harm can be more correctly assessed if distinguished from the permanent after-
effect of the injury. Arguably, a detailed nomenclature can enhance the degree of control 
that the courts exercise on awards, because the one head of damage-covers-all approach, 
exemplified by German law, leaves the field more open for creative ontologies of harm 
devised by claimants’ lawyers and their medical and other experts. But it also carries, as 
shown in this paper, the risk of greater overlap between different heads of damage. 
This paper does not discuss in detail the different approaches of contemporary 
jurisdictions with regard to the evaluation of non-pecuniary harm and the debate 
surrounding it,287 but has touched upon the principal methods of assessment and their 
importance. In terms of principle, the evaluation of non-pecuniary harm raises the 
important issue of whether it can or should be done on an objective or a subjective basis, and 
the role of functionality or incapacity metrics. Suffice it to say here that most jurisdictions 
leave it to the judge’s equitable and fair judgment to assess the loss, usually with the 
aid of national indices and tables to promote uniformity, and on the basis of a primarily 
objective assessment supplemented by adding something extra in the award for particular 
personal circumstances that exist in the particular case. Incapacity metrics are also used in 
some countries where relevant, for example in France and Italy, as has been shown. Their 
advantage is that they add to the scientific credibility of the basis of assessment, but when 
they are binding for the judge they stop the judge from assessing non-pecuniary harm in 
an objective way that is not solely based on expert evaluation but also takes into account 
society’s feeling as to what is a fair award.288 Interestingly, empirical evidence outside 
Europe shows that the layperson’s perception of the seriousness, and engagement with the 
issue of compensation, of non-pecuniary harm from personal injury is intra-national and 
intra=communal, with no significant cultural variations.289 A judicial objective assessment, 
to the extent that it is possible, should therefore also serve convergence of awards in 
different jurisdictions, although this is certainly also subject to local variations of economic 
conditions.
The evaluation of non-pecuniary harm raises additional issues of economic efficiency, 
loss allocation and social justice.290 The principle of recovery, and the architecture and 
nomenclature used in the mechanism of recovery, are not themselves immune from such 
considerations. Comparative law shows awareness of these issues in most jurisdictions, 
especially in connection with the deductibility or not of so-called collateral benefits from 
non-pecuniary harm awards. In some jurisdictions, the importance of compensating non-
pecuniary harm as a separate general head (for example, in English law), or, indeed, 
detailing the heads of recovery that fall under this category by means of an authoritative 
nomenclature (for example, in French law), is partly dictated by the desire to ring-fence 
such awards from claims of deduction of collateral benefits. Such ring fencing is obviously 
not economically efficient, but appears to be a strong public choice outcome. At the same 
287 This, it is hoped, will be the subject of a follow-up paper.
288 Juries are still used in the US in assessing non-pecuniary loss damages but not without controversy.
289 See the very interesting study by Kritzer, HM, Bogart, WA and Vidmar, N (1991) ‘The Aftermath of Injury: 
Cultural Factors in Compensation Seeking in Canada and the United States’ (25) Law & Society Review 499; no 
significant effect on compensation seeking of intra-national cultural variations in communities
290 Matters to be explored in a follow-up paper.
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time, the social cost of compensating non-pecuniary harm, especially of the very small 
or so-called ‘trivial’, but widely diffused kind cannot be overlooked, however strong the 
public pressure in favour of compensation might be. An aggravating factor is the greater 
medical uncertainty in the diagnosis of such widespread trivial types of non-pecuniary 
harm such as, for example, whiplash. Insurance industry pressure to reign in claims is in 
this area stronger than generally on non-pecuniary harm recovery. The concerns of the 
insurance industry are, of course, important, as it is to a very large extent the insurance 
industry that makes it possible for recovery to take place. But in the area of non-pecuniary 
harm in several jurisdictions the insurance industry is being wrong-footed by the strong 
emotional appeal that such harm seems to exercise both on the public and on the courts, 
and insurers have been punished for derisory offers of settlement.
Compensation for wrongfully inflicted non-pecuniary harm is increasingly seen in 
contemporary societies as a fundamental right, a right to the most effective remedy for 
violations of all fundamental rights. Jehring would be pleased. Furthermore, combined 
with procedural devices of group litigation, claims for non-pecuniary harm can have a 
broader social and economic impact, as shown by the American experience,291 and may also 
serve as a private law remedy for larger, global wrongs,292 when corporate veils are lifted 
and foreign direct liability of multinationals is accepted, especially for extensive physical 
injury and non-pecuniary harm caused to large numbers of individuals globally through 
violations of basic human rights. Omnis condemnatio pecuniaria est (all condemnation is 
pecuniary): this is a language that wrongdoers, personal and corporate, understand.
291 See Beisner, JH, Shors, M and Davidson Miller, J (2005) ‘Class Action ‘Cops”: Public Servants or Private 
Entrepreneurs?’ (57) Stanford Law Review 1441 
292 See the contributions in Banakas, S (ed.) (2011) Global Wrongs and Private Law Remedies and Procedures Wildy, 
Simmonds and Hill.
